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  [595] 
Why Can’t We Be “Friends”?  
A Call for a Less Stringent Policy for Judges 
Using Online Social Networking 
Brian Hull* 
Judges are increasingly using social networking websites like Facebook, Twitter, 
LinkedIn, MySpace, and Google+, and, naturally, the question arises: What are the 
ethical limits for judges doing so? A number of judicial ethics committees and others 
knowledgeable about judicial ethics have analyzed this question. Not all, however, 
were familiar with the nuances of online social networking. The California Judges 
Association falls into both of these categories. In November 2010, it released an 
advisory opinion, Opinion 66, describing its views on judges using social networking 
sites.  
This Note details the views expressed by Opinion 66 and by opinions from Florida, 
Indiana, Kentucky, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, and Wisconsin. Opinion 66 stated 
that a judge may not include an attorney in her online social network if the attorney is 
appearing before the judge—a view shared by Florida and Oklahoma but rejected by 
Indiana, Kentucky, New York, Ohio, and Wisconsin. This view typifies the failure of 
Opinion 66 to appreciate that the current ethical rules allow a judge to be online 
“friends” with an attorney appearing before her. This failure stemmed in part from a 
lack of recognition that an online connection is not indicative of a close connection.  
Other analytical flaws were the inexplicably higher standard for online contact and the 
lack of appreciation of how social networking sites work.  Opinion 66—and all of the 
other opinions on this subject—also failed to appreciate the benefits of allowing judges 
to use online social networking, including transparency, outreach, and even enforcing 
the ethical rules. 
This Note argues that the California Judges Association can, and should, release a new 
opinion further analyzing the use of social networking sites by judges. 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2012; B.A., University 
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Introduction 
Social networking websites are becoming extremely common and 
judicial ethics committees are finally taking notice. In November 2010, 
the California Judicial Ethics Committee of the California Judges 
Association (the “California Committee”) released an advisory opinion, 
Opinion 66, concerning “what ethical constraints arise when a judge 
participates in online social networking.”
1
 Opinion 66 analyzed three 
issues: (1) whether a judge may be “a member of an online social 
networking community,” (2) whether a judge may include in her online 
social network lawyers who might possibly appear before her, and 
(3) whether “a judge [may] include lawyers who have a case pending 
 
 1. Cal. Judges Ass’n, Judicial Ethics Comm., Advisory Op. 66, at 1 (2010). 
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before the judge” in her online social network.
2
 It answered the first two 
questions with “a very qualified yes” and answered the third question 
with a “no.”
3
 The California Committee, however, was not the first to 
act: It followed committees in several other states, which had released 
ethics opinions after judges inquired about the propriety of being 
members of various social networking sites.
4
 Organizations governing 
judicial ethics in other states should (and probably will) release opinions 
about online social networking soon.
5
 These opinions are important; 
judges need to know what they can and cannot do on social networking 
sites.
6
 Online social networking is extremely popular in the United States 
and the number of people using it continues to grow.
7
 This number 
includes over forty percent of current judges.
8
 The number of judges 
using social networking sites is also growing and will continue to do so.
9
 
 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id.  
 4. See Fla. Sup. Ct. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2010-06 (2010) (clarifying and 
answering questions about an earlier opinion, Op. 2009-20); Ethics Comm. of the Ky. Judiciary, 
Formal Op. JE-119 (2010); Fla. Sup. Ct. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2009-20 (2009); N.Y. 
Advisory Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op. 08-176 (2009); S.C. Advisory Comm. on Standards of Judicial 
Conduct, Op. 17-2009 (2009); see also Adrienne Meiring, Ethical Considerations of Using Social 
Networking Sites, Ind. Ct. Times, Nov.–Dec. 2009, at 10, 10–11 (answering whether Indiana judges can 
use social networks and discussing the ethical considerations of using these sites); Richard J. 
Sankovitz, Can’t We Be Friends? Judges and Social Networking, Third Branch, Winter 2010, at 10, 
10–11 (2010) (discussing how judges in Wisconsin—including the author, a judge at the trial court 
level—are using Facebook, and giving an unofficial opinion about judges using online social 
networking). Adrienne Meiring, counsel to the Indiana Commission on Judicial Qualifications, 
explained that she wrote the column “to address some of these routine ethical questions [about online 
social networking]” that had been asked by a number of judges. Meiring, supra, at 10.  
 5. Ohio released an opinion shortly after California released Opinion 66. See Sup. Ct. of Ohio 
Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline, Op. 2010-7 (2010). Oklahoma released an opinion in 
mid-2011. Okla. Judicial Ethics Advisory Panel, Op. 2011-3 (2011). 
 6. The ABA is considering amending the rules for attorneys. See Steven Seidenberg, Seduced: 
For Lawyers, the Appeal of Social Media Is Obvious. It’s Also Dangerous, A.B.A. J., Feb. 2011, at 48, 
50 (“The working group [of the ABA Commission on Ethics] is studying ethics issues arising from 
lawyers’ use of social media and other technologies . . . and may even recommend significant 
amendments to the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct.”). 
 7. As of June 2010, approximately 66% of online American adults had visited a social 
networking site in the last thirty days. See Experian Simmons, 2010 Social Networking Report 2–3 
(2010). This number increased from 53% in 2008 and 27% in 2007. Id. at 3. 
 8. Conference of Court Pub. Info. Officers, New Media and the Courts: The Current 
Status and a Look at the Future 65 (2010). It is necessary to note that the data gathered in the 
report suffers from possible design flaws. There was a low response rate (less than one in ten 
respondents completed even part of the survey and only about one in twenty completed the survey in 
its entirety) and the “electronic-only survey tool” (what may be called the request for information) 
was “distributed on [an] e-mail-distribution system.” Id. at 64. It seems this biases the survey numbers 
to those who check their email regularly (the survey was open for only a week) and who would 
complete an online-only survey. Furthermore, “judicial officers” (judges, magistrate judges, or 
administrative judges) accounted for just 31.4% of the completed surveys. Id. With the expansion of 
social networking sites, however, there is still a good reason for states to release opinions regardless of 
the numbers of judges using them: The number of judges using these sites will continue to rise. 
 9. See Ginny LaRoe, Local Judges Put Social Media on Trial, Recorder (S.F.), May 23, 2011, at 
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This is especially true because lawyers who were students at the time of 
the online social networking explosion are going to be the next 
generation of judges.
10
 
Other than the handful of opinions released by ethics advisory 
boards, there has been little legal scholarship on the ethics of judges 
using social networking sites.
11
 This Note does not try to answer every 
question relating to judges using online social networking. In the process 
of analyzing the California decision, however, this Note highlights many 
of the issues faced by judicial ethics committees. 
This Note will explain why the California opinion is flawed both 
from a legal perspective and as a matter of policy. Part I provides a brief 
description of online social networking. Part II analyzes the advisory 
opinions released by California, Florida, Indiana, Kentucky, New York, 
Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Wisconsin to illustrate different 
interpretations of the propriety of judges using online social networks. 
Part III examines the California Code of Judicial Ethics,
12
 authoritative 
interpretations of the California Code, and the interpretations of judicial 
ethics codes in other states to show why Opinion 66 is flawed in the way 
it interpreted the law. Among other faults, it applied the applicable 
language far too strictly. Part III will also explain why Opinion 66 is 
wrong as a matter of policy. The opinion neglects to consider the 
potential of online social networking to increase transparency in the 
court process, educate the public, and improve the conduct of attorneys 
and fellow judges. It also created a potentially perverse situation in which 
a judge could be found to be exhibiting bias despite the lack of any actual 
bias. Part IV of this Note proposes solutions that the California 
 
5, (discussing recent appointees’ use of online social networking and the use of Twitter by judges who 
have been on the bench for some time). Ethics committees and others are taking note and discussing 
the ethics of judges using social media. See Judicial Ethics and the Intersection of Social Media and the 
Courtroom, Nat’l Jud. C., (Aug. 15, 2011), http://www.judges.org/news/news081511.html (discussing 
briefly the lack of consensus regarding the use of social media by judges and a forthcoming 
presentation “devoted to ethical concerns of the use of social media by judges”). 
 10. See LaRoe, supra note 9. In addition, this conclusion is based on data showing that, as of Fall 
2009, 69% of Americans aged thirty-five to forty-nine and 88% of Americans aged eighteen to thirty-
four have visited a social networking site within the past thirty days. See Experian Simmons, supra note 
7, at 3. America’s future judges are included in that data. 
 11. See James J. Alfini, Future Trends in Judicial Ethics: The Influence of Cyberspace, 51 S. Tex. 
L. Rev. 851, 851 (“In the coming years, there will be a compelling need to address new circumstances 
with creativity, greater attention to rigorous analysis of judicial ethics provisions (particularly 
appearance of impropriety) by state high courts in deciding judicial misconduct cases, and an increased 
emphasis on judicial education.”); Angela O’Brien, Comment, Are Attorneys and Judges One Tweet, 
Blog or Friend Request Away from Facing a Disciplinary Committee?, 11 Loy. J. Pub. Int. L. 511, 525 
(2010) (discussing three state ethics opinions concerning judges’ use of social networking sites and 
analyzing the applicability of the Model Code of Judicial Conduct to judges’ use of social media). 
 12. This examination includes the analysis of the canons in David M. Rothman, California 
Judicial Conduct Handbook (3d ed. 2007).  
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Committee should consider, including a call for the Committee to issue a 
new opinion that is more detailed and nuanced. 
I.  Social Networking Websites 
There is a wide variety of social networking websites.
13
 The most 
widely used are Facebook,
14
 Twitter,
15
 LinkedIn,
16
 and MySpace
17
. There 
is also a site on the rise called “Google+”.
18
 These sites all have distinct 
features, although, to a degree, their features are becoming remarkably 
similar. In addition, all of the sites allow users to restrict much of the 
personal information that can be seen by others. 
Facebook is the most used site for social networking.
19
 A user 
creates a profile that contains personal information about her; this may 
include, among other things, interests, education, contact information, 
 
 13. Conference of Court Pub. Info. Officers, supra note 8, at 28–29, 37 (describing Facebook, 
MySpace, LinkedIn, Ning, Twitter, Tumblr, Plurk, and mentioning other sites such as MyYearbook, 
Bebo, and BlackPlanet). Technically, sites such as Twitter are “microblogging” sites, but these sites 
are often mentioned when discussing popular sites that create possible ethics issues for attorneys and 
judges. See id. at 37–39; see also O’Brien, supra note 11, at 512–14 (2010) (introducing Facebook, 
MySpace, and Twitter in a comment intended to explore ethical issues for attorneys and judges); 
Daniel J. Crothers, Judicial Use of Social Media, Nasje (Jan. 26, 2011), http://news.nasje.org/?p=142 
(discussing from the perspective of a North Dakota supreme court justice the concerns about ex parte 
communication occurring on social networking sites). 
 14. Facebook has more than 800 million active users. Statistics, Facebook, 
http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?statistics (last visited Dec. 23, 2011). About 143 million of 
these are in the United States. Facebook.com, Quantcast, http://www.quantcast.com/facebook.com 
(last visited Dec. 23, 2011).  
 15. Twitter had more than 200 million users as of April 2011. Shea Bennett, How Many Users 
Does Twitter Have? 200 Million! No, Wait, 362 Million! Uh, Split The Difference?, Media Bistro, 
http://www.mediabistro.com/alltwitter/how-many-twitter-users_b13110 (Aug. 26, 2011, 6:00 AM). 
About sixty-eight million of these are in the United States. Twitter.com, Quantcast, 
http://www.quantcast.com/twitter.com (last visited Dec. 23, 2011). 
 16. LinkedIn had more than 120 million users as of August 4, 2011; this number is increasing at a 
rate of two members per second (which is more than 600,000 per week). LinkedIn Press Center, About 
Us, LinkedIn, http://press.linkedin.com/about/ (last visited Dec. 23, 2011). 
 17. MySpace has about nineteen million users in the United States. Myspace.com, Quantcast, 
http://www.quantcast.com/myspace.com (last visited Dec. 23, 2011). This number continues decline as 
the other online social networks grow. See id. (charting the decrease in the number of visitors to 
MySpace each month). 
 18. See Claire Cain Miller, Another Try by Google to Take on Facebook, N.Y. Times, June 29, 
2011, at B1, (discussing Google+ as a new social networking service). At least twenty million people 
have signed up for Google+. Scott Cameron, Google Plus: Do You Need Another Social Network?, 
NPR (Aug. 6, 2011, 6:57 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/talk/2011/08/06/138828455/google-plus-do-
you-need-another-social-network. It is difficult to document how many unique visitors Google+ has 
because the site is tied to Google.com, which is the most trafficked site in the United States. See 
Google.com, Quantcast, http://www.quantcast.com/google.com (last visited Dec. 23, 2011). There has 
been an increase in the number of unique visitors to Google.com since Google+ was released but it is 
difficult to say whether that increase is due to Google+ or something else. See id. (charting the number 
of visitors, with an increase beginning in June).  
 19. Facebook has the most users of the five sites mentioned and the most users in the United 
States. See supra notes 14–18. 
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and work history.
20
 Each user, as part of the profile, also has a “wall:” “a 
place to post and share content with . . . friends” including photos, 
videos, links, application content, and a user’s own status.
21
 Users with 
profiles can “friend” or “add as a friend” other members of Facebook, 
provided that the other person accepts the “friend request.”
22
 Once 
“friends,” a user can “tag” the other in a photo they see; post a comment, 
link, or video on the other person’s wall; and much more.
23
 Facebook, in 
a sense, is driven by having friends. Users can also follow “pages”: 
profiles for public figures, bands, universities, athletes, companies, and 
celebrities.
24
 Following a page (also called becoming a “fan” of a page) is 
essentially a one-way friend request—the page administrator does not 
screen requests, although the administrator may remove people who 
“like” or follow it.
25
 
Each Facebook user also has a home page that includes the News 
Feed, a “constantly updating list” of information about the user’s 
“friends” (or pages followed), including posts, photos tags, friend 
requests, event RSVPs, group membership, and status updates (and 
possibly comments by users).
26
 If this is not enough, nearly all of these 
 
 20. Factsheet, Facebook, http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?factsheet (last visited Dec. 23, 
2011). Facebook, however, is not sitting idle; the site is continuously changing. Recently, it announced 
a new format for user profiles, called the “timeline.” See Barbara Ortutay & Michael Liedtke, Facebook 
Redesigns Profiles, Adds “Timeline,” Associated Press (Sept. 22, 2011), http://news.yahoo.com/ 
facebook-redesigns-profiles-adds-timeline-175250945.html. The development may lead to changes in 
other online social networks, but this Note’s analysis and basic descriptions of the sites are still 
relevant.  
 21. Facebook Help Center, What Can I Do on the Wall? (Timeline), Facebook, http:// 
www.facebook.com/help/?faq=224964477515963 (last visited Dec. 23, 2011). 
 22. Facebook Help Center, How Do I Add a Friend?, Facebook, http://www.facebook.com/ 
help/?faq=146466588759199 (last visited Dec. 23, 2011). 
 23. How Tagging Works, Facebook, http://www.facebook.com/about/tagging (last visited Dec. 23, 
2011). 
 24. Discover Facebook Pages, Facebook, http://www.facebook.com/pages (last visited Dec. 23, 
2011). 
 25. Press Release, Who’s Sharing on Facebook?, Facebook (Mar. 4, 2009), http://www.facebook.com/ 
press/releases.php?p=87889; Facebook Help Center, How Do I Remove Someone Who Is Connected to 
My Page?, Facebook, http://www.facebook.com/help/?faq=222702104422027 (last visited Dec. 23, 
2011). It is also possible to follow something without “liking” it. See Ortutay & Liedtke, supra note 20 
(“We are making it so you can connect to anything you want. . . . [Y]ou don’t have to like a book, you 
can just read a book.” (quoting Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg)). 
 26. See Facebook Help Center, What Is News Feed?, Facebook, http://www.facebook.com/ 
help/?faq=210346402339221 (last visited Dec. 23, 2011); Facebook Help Center, What Types of Content 
Can Appear in News Feed?, Facebook, http://www.facebook.com/help/?faq=211104095587055 (last 
visited Dec. 23, 2011). In addition, Facebook allows a variety of applications to be installed: from 
games to quizzes to filling out March Madness brackets. Recently, the site even launched a service to 
send reminders of court dates to litigants in Philadelphia. Facebook Help Center, What Is an App on 
Facebook?, Facebook, http://www.facebook.com/help/?faq=217453588274571 (last visited Dec. 23, 
2011) (listing examples); Kara Mignanelli, Friend Request! The District Court Wants to Be Friends on 
Facebook, Social Axcess (Aug. 5, 2011), http://socialaxcess.com/2011/08/05/friend-request-the-
district-court-wants-to-be-friends-on-facebook/ (discussing the plans of Philadelphia’s First Judicial 
District to send reminders of court dates to litigants via text message, Facebook, and Twitter); see, e.g., 
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things can be “liked”: a simple click for a user to tell the rest of Facebook 
that she “likes” whatever that is.
27
 
There is also a somewhat recently developed feature of Facebook 
called the “friendship page.”
28
 This page shows the common history of 
two “friends,” including posts on each other’s walls, events both users 
attended, pictures together, and things both people have “liked.”
29
 This 
page can also be seen by any user who is “friends” with both people—
provided that both people’s privacy settings allow the information to be 
shared with their other “friends.”
30
 
Twitter is a site where users post “tweets” of 140 characters or less.
31
 
Similar to a Facebook’s wall-posting feature, Twitter users can also 
include photos, videos, links, or other content as part of a tweet.
32
 In 
addition, some use Twitter “simply . . . as a way to get the latest 
information on their interests.”
33
 Importantly, each user may choose to 
follow particular accounts (possibly a friend, celebrity, business, or a 
news source) to see what those users have tweeted.
34
 The tweets show up 
on the user’s “Home Timeline”—a collection of the tweets of the people 
the user follows, from most recent to least recent.
35
 This may also include 
“retweets”: one user’s tweets rebroadcasted by another user.
36
 Twitter 
 
Quiz Creator, Facebook, http://www.facebook.com/thequizcreator (last visited Dec. 23, 2011) (offering 
a quiz-making app); CBSSports.com Brackets, Facebook, http://www.facebook.com/apps/ 
application.php?id=5713520924 (last visited Dec. 23, 2011) (offering a March Madness bracket app). 
There is even dedicated space for games on Facebook. What Are the Application Dashboard and the 
Games Dashboard?, Facebook, http://www.facebook.com/help/?faq=219209578106339 (last visited 
Dec. 23, 2011). 
 27. See Facebook Help Center, What Is the Like Feature?, Facebook, http://www.facebook.com/ 
help/?faq=200273576682757 (last visited Dec. 23, 2011) (“‘Like’ is a way to give positive feedback or to 
connect with things you care about on Facebook. You can like content that your friends post to give 
them feedback or like a Page that you want to connect with on Facebook.”). Of course, despite this 
description, just because someone “likes” something does not necessarily mean they are giving it 
positive feedback. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. 
 30. Facebook Help Center, Who Else Can See a Friendship Page Between Me and One of My 
Friends?, Facebook, http://www.facebook.com/help/?faq=185127274870484 (last visited Dec. 23, 2011). 
 31. Twitter Help Center, Twitter 101: How Should I Get Started Using Twitter?, Twitter, 
http://support.twitter.com/groups/31-twitter-basics/topics/104-welcome-to-twitter-support/articles/215585 
(last visited Dec. 23, 2011).  
 32. Twitter Is the Best Way to Discover What’s New in Your World, Twitter, http://twitter.com/ 
about (last visited Dec. 23, 2011). 
 33. Id. Indeed, many judges, including Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer, use Twitter as a 
news source. LaRoe, supra note 9.  
 34. Twitter 101: How Should I Get Started Using Twitter?, supra note 31.  
 35. Twitter Help Center, What Is a Timeline?, Twitter, http://support.twitter.com/articles/164083 
(last visited Dec. 23, 2011).  
 36. Id. To make this clear, say Person A is following Celebrity B. Celebrity B decides to retweet 
an article posted by Company C. While Person A does not follow Company C, the article that 
Company C tweeted may be seen in the “Home Timeline” of Person A. This, of course, does not have 
to be a link to an article or a video but may be just a regular tweet.  
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users also can see who a particular user is following and who follows that 
user (though this can be restricted).
37
 Twitter is a bit different from the 
other social networking sites mentioned in that following is not mutual: 
“Someone who thinks you’re interesting can follow you, and you don’t 
have to approve, or follow back.”
38
 Overall, Twitter focuses less on the 
social networking aspect
39
 and more on being a forum for people to post 
what they think or have read—a characteristic mentioned by many of the 
ethics opinions. 
LinkedIn is the largest online professional network.
40
 It is a site 
where professionals (and students) can network by inviting one another 
to “connect.”
41
 A user makes a profile that contains her professional 
experience, goals, education, and other information.
42
 Similar to 
Facebook, a user can post a “status,” though these are intended to be 
“professional updates.”
43
 There are also “groups” on the site, places 
where users can comment on or follow threaded discussions.
44
 The 
LinkedIn site even has a “guide” for attorneys, which includes a 
recommendation that users post “timely legal commentary” in an area of 
the site called “LinkedIn Answers.”
45
 LinkedIn also has a feature to 
allow a user to see who has viewed her profile.
46
 Again, though, the 
emphasis on this site is that the connection is a professional relationship. 
 
 37. Twitter Help Center, What Is Following?, Twitter, http://support.twitter.com/groups/31-
twitter-basics/topics/108-finding-following-people/articles/14019 (last visited Dec. 23, 2011). 
 38. Id. 
 39. This may be changing, especially among attorneys. See Jay Shepherd, Small Firms, Big 
Lawyers: Twitter and Business Cards at the ABA TechShow, Above the Law (Apr., 15, 2011, 11:35 
AM), http://abovethelaw.com/2011/04/small-firms-big-lawyers-twitter-and-business-cards-at-the-aba-
techshow/ (discussing how lawyers network by trading Twitter usernames). 
 40. See LinkedIn Learning Center, What Is LinkedIn?, LinkedIn, http://learn.linkedin.com/what-
is-linkedin/ (last visited Dec. 23, 2011); LinkedIn Press Center, About Us, LinkedIn, 
http://press.linkedin.com/about/ (last visited Dec. 23, 2011). This is one distinction between the online 
social networks: LinkedIn markets itself as a professional network more than as a social network, but 
this distinction is based simply on the site’s intended use, not its actual use. As discussed in this Part, 
LinkedIn’s features are remarkably similar to those of the other sites. 
 41. LinkedIn Help Center, Building Your Professional Network, LinkedIn, https://help.linkedin.com/ 
app/answers/detail/a_id/348/ (last visited Dec. 23, 2011) (describing how to make connections). 
 42. LinkedIn Learning Center, Profiles, LinkedIn, http://learn.linkedin.com/profiles/ (last visited 
Dec. 23, 2011). 
 43. Id. 
 44. LinkedIn Learning Center, Groups, LinkedIn, http://learn.linkedin.com/groups/ (last visited 
Dec. 23, 2011). 
 45. LinkedIn Learning Center, Attorneys, LinkedIn, http://learn.linkedin.com/attorneys/ (last 
visited Dec. 23, 2011). LinkedIn Answers is an area where questions about a large number of areas 
(such as business travel, conferences and event planning, health, hiring and human resources, law and 
legal services) can be posed and then answered by users of the site. LinkedIn Answers, LinkedIn, 
http://www.linkedin.com/answers (last visited Dec. 23, 2011). One of these sections is “Law and 
Legal,” which has subdivisions of corporate law (which has further divisions), criminal law, 
employment and labor law, property law, and tax law. LinkedIn Answers, Law & Legal Questions, 
LinkedIn, http://www.linkedin.com/answers/browse/law-legal/LAW (last visited Dec. 23, 2011). 
 46. “Who’s Viewed Your Profile” Overview and Privacy, LinkedIn, https://help.linkedin.com/ 
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MySpace is another social networking site that, although in decline, 
is still in use.
47
 Some, however, may hesitate to call it a social networking 
site anymore.
48
 Nevertheless, it is important to discuss when examining 
judicial ethics because “MySpace is still rather popular among 
individuals who end up in the criminal justice system.”
49
 In addition, 
commentators and most of the advisory committees still mention 
MySpace when discussing social networking sites.
50
 Furthermore, a judge 
pro tem lost his position because of his MySpace profile after it was 
discovered that the profile suggested a bias against prosecutors.
51
 
MySpace is similar to Facebook in that users create profiles, play 
games, post updates, and follow the progress of their “friends” doing 
these things.
52
 The only real differences between MySpace and Facebook 
 
app/answers/detail/a_id/42 (last visited Dec. 23, 2011). 
 47. See Dawn C. Chmielewski & David Sarno, Once-Trendy MySpace Hits an Awkward Stage, 
L.A. Times, June 17, 2009 (Business), at 1 (noting that the number of MySpace users is declining and 
projected to fall further); Brandon Dimmel, MySpace CEO Abandons Ship as Site’s Popularity 
Diminishes, Infopackets (Feb. 12, 2010, 10:29 PM EST), http://www.infopackets.com/news/ 
internet/2010/20100212_myspace_ceo_abandons_ship_as_sites_popularity_diminishes.htm (stating that 
the popularity of MySpace is declining); see also John D. Sutter, Praise for MySpace’s New Look—But 
That Logo?, CNN (Oct. 27, 2010, 14:48 GMT), http://edition.cnn.com/2010/TECH/web/10/27/ 
myspace.revamp/ (“Everyone knows MySpace has fallen on hard times in recent years . . . . [It is] 
repositioning itself not as a social network . . . but as a ‘social entertainment destination for Gen Y.’”). 
The site is called “MySpace,” “Myspace,” or “My______” depending on where you look. See id. (using 
all three of the terms while discussing the newest, which is “My_____.”). For simplicity, I will refer to it 
as “MySpace” throughout this Note. 
 48. See Sutter, supra note 47 (“[MySpace] seems to be emphasizing [promoting bands and 
celebrities on video- and audio-heavy pages] and largely abandoning the social network aspects of the 
site.”). The company itself has said it does not want to compete with Facebook, but instead would 
prefer to be a complementary service focusing on music and, to a lesser extent, movies, television, and 
video games. Alexei Oreskovic, MySpace Launching New Version of Website, Reuters (Oct. 27, 2010), 
http://www.reuters.com/assets/print?aid=USTRE69Q11M20101027. 
 49. Derrick Harris, How Social Media Is Pushing the Limits of Legal Ethics, GigaOM (Feb. 26, 
2011, 12:00 PM), http://gigaom.com/2011/02/26/how-social-media-is-pushing-the-limits-of-legal-ethics/ 
(quoting Jennifer Lynch, a staff attorney with the Electronic Frontier Foundation). 
 50. Cal. Judges Ass’n, Judicial Ethics Comm., Advisory Op. 66, at 1 (2010); Ethics Comm. of the 
Ky. Judiciary, Formal Op. JE-119 (2010); Sankovitz, supra note 4, at 10; Sup. Ct. of Ohio Bd. of 
Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline, Op. 2010-7, at 5 (2010). 
 51. K.C. Howard, MySpace Judgment: Guilty, Las Vegas Rev. J. (Aug. 13, 2007, 10:00 PM), 
http://www.lvrj.com/news/9121536.html (last updated Sept. 26, 2008, 4:38 PM) (discussing how, in 2007, 
a substitute judge in North Las Vegas was dismissed for appearing to have a bias against prosecutors 
by listing one of his interests as: “Breaking my foot off in a prosecutor’s ass . . . and improving my 
ability to break my foot off in a prosecutor’s ass.”). 
 52. See What’s New with the Myspace Homepage, MySpace, http://www.myspace.com/ 
guide/homepage (last visited Dec. 23, 2011); Find Friends, MySpace, http://www.myspace.com/help 
(enter “Friends” into the search box, then follow the link with the same name) (last visited Dec. 23, 
2011). It also has an option to import a user’s Facebook interests and sync updates with Twitter, 
Facebook, and YouTube. See Import Your Interests, Mashup with Facebook, MySpace, 
http://www.myspace.com/guide/mashup (last visited Dec. 23, 2011) (detailing the importing of interests 
from Facebook); Sync with Facebook Twitter and Youtube, MySpace, http://www.myspace.com/ 
guide/sync (last visited Dec. 23, 2011) (explaining how to sync interests). Note that “YouTube” is a 
video sharing site, not a social network. See About YouTube, YouTube, http://www.youtube.com/t/ 
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are that MySpace has a different layout, a different user base, and a 
different emphasis. 
Google+ is the newest of the social networks and is on the rise.
53
 It 
can be summarized as a combination between Twitter and Facebook.
54
 A 
user can follow others as on Twitter,
55
 post updates, photos, links, and 
other features similar to Facebook.
56
 Also, users can “+1” a post or 
article located on various other sites (for example, an article on 
sfgate.com, the website for the San Francisco Chronicle)
57
—similar to 
“liking” on Facebook. 
II.  The Issues Addressed by Advisory Opinions 
No judge has been punished for using an online social network in 
violation of the canons of the California Judicial Code of Ethics—at least 
not yet. This can be shown by reviewing the annual reports of discipline, 
which are released by the California Commission on Judicial Performance. 
The Commission’s disciplinary actions include public removal, public 
censure, public admonishment, private admonishment, and advisory 
letters.
58
 No published disciplinary measure explicitly mentions an online 
social network or implicitly refers to social networking activities.
59
 
 
about_youtube (last visited Dec. 23, 2011). 
 53. See supra note 18. But see Paul Tassi, A Eulogy for Google Plus, Forbes (Aug. 15, 2011, 10:54 
AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/insertcoin/2011/08/15/a-eulogy-for-google-plus/2/ (predicting that 
Google+ will not last long because it is too similar to Facebook); Paul Tassi, The Rise of the Google 
Plus Faithful, Forbes (Aug. 15, 2011, 3:45 PM) http://www.forbes.com/sites/insertcoin/2011/08/15/the-
rise-of-the-google-plus-faithful/2/ (predicting that perhaps Google+ will last but will not become more 
popular than or “destroy” Facebook). 
 54. Matt Hartman, The Google+ Double Filter Model, Nonsequitorial (Aug. 13, 2011), 
http://matthartman.tumblr.com/post/8865698480/the-google-double-filter-model. 
 55. About Circles, Google+, http://www.google.com/support/+/bin/static.py?hl=en&page= 
guide.cs&guide=1257347&rd=1 (last visited Dec. 23, 2011). 
 56. See supra note 21 and accompanying text; see also How To, Google+, http://www.google.com/ 
support/+/?hl=en (last visited Dec. 23, 2011). 
 57. About the +1 Button, Google+, http://www.google.com/support/plus/bin/static.py?page= 
guide.cs&guide=1207011&answer=1047397 (last visited Dec. 23, 2011). 
 58. Rothman, supra note 12, § 12.85 (3d ed. 2007). 
 59. The California Commission on Judicial Performance has issued some private admonishments 
and advisory letters responding to conduct that perhaps could have taken place on an online social 
network or that could occur over social networking sites in the future (forwarding an email could be 
similar to posting on a wall or posting as a status). See, e.g., Cal. Comm’n on Judicial Performance, 
2009 Annual Report 18 (2009) (“During trial, a judge contacted one of the counsel’s supervisors ex 
parte to criticize the attorney’s performance.”); Cal. Comm’n on Judicial Performance, 2008 
Annual Report 26 (2008) (“A judge used the court computer to forward to judicial officers a satirical 
e-mail that promoted negative stereotypes about people from a certain country, apparently realizing 
that it would be offensive to at least one judge whose ancestors were from that country.”); Cal. 
Comm’n on Judicial Performance, 2007 Annual Report 32 (2007) (“A judge participated in an ex 
parte communication by email with a district attorney about a pending case.”); Cal. Comm’n on 
Judicial Performance, 2006 Annual Report 32 (2006) (discussing ex parte communications without 
discussing the precise manner in which they occurred, leaving open the  possibility that they occurred 
online); Cal. Comm’n on Judicial Performance, 2004 Annual Report 22 (2004) (“A judge engaged 
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The California Committee considered three main issues in Opinion 
66: (1) the propriety of a judge being a member of an online social 
network, (2) the propriety of a judge including in her online social 
network lawyers who might appear before her, and (3) the propriety of a 
judge including a lawyer in her online social network while the lawyer 
has a case pending before the judge.
60
 Other states, including Florida, 
Indiana, Kentucky, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and 
Wisconsin, also have considered these questions, though some have 
phrased them differently or have combined the analysis of the 
questions.
61
 As this Note focuses on the California decision, it will 
consider the questions as addressed by the California Committee. 
Before analyzing the decision, it is important to understand the 
framework of judicial ethics in California and function of the California 
Committee. All members of the California judiciary must comply with 
the California Code of Judicial Ethics.
62
 The Committee has “studied 
questions presented to it by judges, and has occasionally given formal 
opinions.”
63
 The California Supreme Court and the California 
Commission on Judicial Performance “give weight to these opinions, 
especially the Formal Opinions.”
64
 The Committee developed this 
reputation by frequently providing informal advice to judges and by 
releasing annual “Judicial Ethics Updates” for judges.
65
 Currently, there 
is no case in which the California Supreme Court or the Commission on 
Judicial Performance has disregarded the Committee.
66
 
 
in extensive use of a court computer during court hours over a period of at least two years for a 
purpose specifically prohibited by court policy.”). 
 60. Cal. Judges Ass’n, Judicial Ethics Comm., Advisory Op. 66, at 1 (2010). 
 61. See generally Okla. Judicial Ethics Advisory Panel, Op. 2011-3 (2011); Ethics Comm. of the 
Ky. Judiciary, Formal Op. JE-119 (2010); Sup. Ct. of Ohio Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & 
Discipline, Op. 2010-7 (2010); Fla. Sup. Ct. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2009-20 (2009); N.Y. 
Advisory Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op. 08-176 (2009); S.C. Advisory Comm. on Standards of Judicial 
Conduct, Op. 17-2009 (2009); Meiring, supra note 4 (the Indiana “unofficial opinion”); Sankovitz, 
supra note 4 (the Wisconsin “unofficial opinion”). 
 62. Cal. Code of Judicial Ethics pmbl. (2009); see also Rothman, supra note 12, § 1.30, at 13 
(noting that compliance with the Code is mandatory). Rothman notes that there was dispute as to 
whether the Code was mandatory before 1996, despite its application by the California Supreme Court 
in judicial conduct cases, but it is now clear that it applies to all members of the judiciary. Rothman, 
supra note 12, § 1.30, at 13 n.27; see also id. § 12.82 (discussing the importance of the California Code of 
Judicial Ethics). 
 63. Rothman, supra note 12, § 12.83, at 662. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. By this I mean exactly that: There are no cases that disagree with the reasoning of the 
Committee. There have been changes in the rules, which supersede opinions released by the 
Committee. That clearly is some kind of disagreement, but it is difficult to say it was with the 
Committee itself because the Committee was just interpreting the existing rule.  As one looks through 
the reasons expressed for changing the rules, however, there is never a reference to explicitly 
superseding an opinion by the Committee. 
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A. May Judges Use Online Social Networking? 
 1. California 
The first question the California Committee addressed in Opinion 
66 was whether a judge could “be a member of an online social 
networking community.”
67
 It answered “a very qualified yes.”
68
 After 
looking at Canon 4A of the California Code of Judicial Ethics
69
 and its 
commentary, it advised that judges could “use technology to accomplish 
what is otherwise permissible under the Code.”
70
 Next, the opinion 
discussed the ethical limits of five “unique issues”
71
 posed by the use of 
technology necessary for online social networking.
72
 First, it noted how 
comments on social networking sites are not private but are like any 
other public comment a judge may make.
73
 The Committee added that 
this means Canon 3B(9)
74
 controls what a judge may “say” (post, tweet, 
and so forth) online.
75
 The other four “unique issues” related to other 
aspects of the Code of Judicial Ethics and were all essentially reminders 
to judges about the public nature of social networking sites.
76
 Opinion 66 
cautioned judges against violating Canon 4A by casting doubt on their 
ability to act impartially and reminded judges not to exhibit bias or 
demean the judicial office.
77
 The opinion further discouraged both 
impermissible online political activity, in violation of Canon 5, and 
lending the prestige of the judicial office to advance the personal 
interests of the judges or others.
78
 
To address this first issue, the Committee highlighted the 
differences between interaction on social networking sites and 
interaction face to face. Opinion 66 stated that for a judge to avoid 
 
 67. Cal. Judges Ass’n, Judicial Ethics Comm., Advisory Op. 66, at 1 (2010). 
 68. Id. 
 69. Canon 4A states: “A judge shall conduct all of the judge’s extrajudicial activities so that they 
do not (1) cast reasonable doubt on the judge’s capacity to act impartially; (2) demean the judicial 
office; or (3) interfere with the proper performance of judicial duties.” Cal. Code of Judicial Ethics 
Canon 4A (2009). 
 70. Cal. Judges Ass’n, Judicial Ethics Comm., Advisory Op. 66, at 3–4 (2010). 
 71. The Committee noted that this was not an exhaustive list. Id. at 4. 
 72. Id. at 4–6. 
 73. Id. at 4–5. 
 74. Canon 3B(9) prohibits “public comment about a pending or impending proceeding in any 
court” and “nonpublic comment that might substantially interfere with a fair trial or hearing.” It 
allows the judge to discuss legal education programs and cases in appellate courts, as long as the 
comments or discussion will not interfere with a fair hearing of the current case. Cal. Code of 
Judicial Ethics Canon 3B(9) (2009). 
 75. Cal. Judges Ass’n, Judicial Ethics Comm., Advisory Op. 66, at 4–5 (2010). 
 76. Id. at 4–6. 
 77. Id. at 5 (citing Cal. Code of Judicial Ethics Canon 2A) (using Canon 2A as a baseline for 
what is acceptable and warning judges that they must always act in a manner “that promotes public 
confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary”).  
 78. Id. at 5–6. 
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casting doubt on her ability to act impartially, the judge has an 
affirmative obligation to frequently check and remove, repudiate, or hide 
comments made by others that may be distasteful or offensive.
79
 While 
discussing the duty to uphold the reputation of the judicial office, the 
Committee colorfully declared:  
Online activities that would be permissible and appropriate for a 
member of the general public may be improper for a judge. While it 
may be acceptable for a college student to post photographs of himself 
or herself engaged in a drunken revelry, it is not appropriate for a 
judge to do so.
80
 
The Committee found that using features of a social networking site, 
like creating a link to an organization or commenting on a proposed 
legislative matter, may constitute impermissible political activity.
81
 The 
discussion about lending prestige did not mention anything specific to 
technology, though the opinion noted that if a post is associated with the 
judge, then the post would fall under Canon 2B—meaning the judge 
would have to avoid “post[ing] any material that could be construed as 
advancing the interests of the judge or others.”
82
 
 2. Other States 
Every other state that released an opinion relating to online social 
networking has approved of social networking use by judges.
83
 Most 
committees appeared to do so without much reservation. The New York 
Advisory Committee on Judicial Ethics said it “cannot discern anything 
inherently inappropriate about a judge joining and making use of a social 
network.”
84
 It even recognized there are several reasons a judge might 
want to join such an online community.
85
 The New York Advisory 
Committee thought the true question was “not whether a judge can use a 
social network but, rather, how he/she does so.”
86
 The New York opinion 
added that posts on a profile page (either the judge’s or another user’s) 
may violate its Rules Governing Judicial Conduct, and referenced an 
opinion specifically advising a court not to link to the website for an 
 
 79. Id. at 5. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 5–6. The opinion presumably uses the same definition of “political organizations” as 
does the Code of Judicial Ethics, meaning “political party, political action committee, or other group, 
principal purpose of which is to further the election or appointment of candidates to nonjudicial 
office.” See Cal. Code of Judicial Ethics Terminology. In addition, by “proposed legislative 
measure” the opinion surely means legislative measures not related to “improvement of the law, the 
legal system, or the administration of justice.” See id. Canon 5. 
 82. Cal. Judges Ass’n, Judicial Ethics Comm., Advisory Op. 66, at 6 (2010). 
 83. See supra note 61. 
 84. N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op. 08-176 (2009). 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. (emphasis added). 
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advocacy group for Megan’s Law.
87
 The Florida Judicial Ethics Advisory 
Committee agreed that the state’s ethics code does not forbid using social 
networking sites,
88
 but noted that using online social networking could 
lead to violations, depending on the content of the judge’s post.
89
 Ohio 
also declined to take issue with a judge using social networking sites, 
although the state’s Board on Grievances and Disputes noted, “[A] 
judge’s participation on a social networking site must be done carefully 
in order to comply with the ethical rules in the Ohio Code of Judicial 
Conduct.”
90
 Oklahoma echoed these statements, noting a judge may use 
online social networks but the judge “must not use the [online social] 
network in a manner that would otherwise violate the Code of Judicial 
Conduct.”
91
 The opinion emphasized that the conduct must not create 
the perception the judge engaged in conduct that reflects adversely on 
her impartiality.
92
 Unofficial opinions
93
 issued in Indiana and Wisconsin 
echoed the New York and Ohio opinions: Participation in online social 
networking is permissible as long as judges do not violate another part of 
the code.
94
 The South Carolina Advisory Committee even seemed to 
encourage judges to be members of social networking sites because doing 
so “allows the community to see how the judge communicates and gives 
the community a better understanding of the judge.”
95
 
The opinion issued by the Ethics Committee of the Kentucky 
Judiciary expressed the most reservations as to whether judges may use 
online social networking and answered the question with a “Qualified 
Yes.”
96
 It dealt with the question fairly quickly, though, explaining that 
 
 87. Id. 
 88. Fla. Sup. Ct. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2009-20 (2009) (“The [Florida] Code of 
Judicial Conduct does not address or restrict a judge’s . . . method of communication but rather 
addresses its substance.”). However, the Florida Advisory Committee did say that the substance of a 
judge’s online postings can violate the code of conduct.  
 89. Id. (“Of course, the substance of what is posted may constitute a violation.”). 
 90. Sup. Ct. of Ohio Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline, Op. 2010-7, at 1 (2010). 
 91. Okla. Judicial Ethics Advisory Panel, Op. 2011-3 (2011). 
 92. Id. 
 93. The term “unofficial opinion” is my own. The unofficial opinions cited in this Note are an 
article written by a Wisconsin judge and an article written by a lawyer on the Indiana state ethics 
committee. Although these articles do not carry the same weight as official ethics opinions, they likely 
reflect the way the state in question would decide the issue, as their authors are those one would 
expect to know the answer to, or at least to have a very educated opinion about, the questions raised 
by Opinion 66. 
 94. See Meiring, supra note 4, at 10 (“[J]udges generally can join internet social networks . . . . so 
long as the activities do not otherwise violate the [Indiana Code of Judicial Conduct].”); Sankovitz, 
supra note 4, at 11 (“Facebook and other online social networks are like social networks that are not 
online . . . . [A] blanket ban on joining such groups has never been suggested.”). 
 95. S.C. Advisory Comm. on Standards of Judicial Conduct, Op. 17-2009 (2009). This opinion 
responded to a question from a magistrate judge, but there is little reason to think this distinction 
makes a difference, as the opinion still cites the state’s judicial code of conduct. 
 96. Ethics Comm. of the Ky. Judiciary, Formal Op. JE-119, at 1 (2010). Note the actual question 
answered by the Kentucky Ethics Committee was a compound question: “May a Kentucky judge or 
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while the Kentucky Judicial Code of Conduct “was promulgated . . . long 
before social networking sites” developed, judges have to maintain high 
standards of conduct.
97
 The Kentucky Committee admitted it “struggled 
with this issue” and almost answered a “Qualified No.”
98
 The tipping 
point was that Kentucky judges are elected and should not be isolated 
from their community.
99
 The Kentucky Ethics Committee, like the 
California Committee but using less colorful language, specifically 
advised that “pictures and commentary posted on sites which might be of 
questionable taste, but otherwise acceptable for members of the general 
public, may be inappropriate for judges.”
100
 The Kentucky committee 
also advised that the judges be mindful of ex parte communications or 
public comment.
101
 
B. May Judges “Friend” Lawyers Who Might Appear Before Them? 
 1. California 
The second issue discussed by Opinion 66 was whether a judge may 
include in her online social network a lawyer who might appear before 
her.
102
 The opinion explained that while a judge should be careful to 
avoid even the appearance of bias or undue influence, the judge also 
should not be separated from the community in which she lives.
103
 It 
added that judges may participate in associations to improve the law, 
even ones that limit membership; online social networking should be the 
same.
104
 In answering this question, the California Committee specified 
that the principal issues were the ones relating to appearances, the 
obligations to disclose the online relationship (and possible recusal), and 
the danger of ex parte communications.
105
 
To deal with the issues relating to appearances, the California 
Committee delineated four factors to determine whether the judge 
“interacting with an attorney on a social networking site would create the 
impression the attorney is in a special position to influence the judge and 
 
justice, consistent with the code of judicial conduct, participate in an internet-based social networking 
site, such as Facebook, LinkedIn, MySpace, or Twitter, and be ‘friends’ with various persons who appear 
before the judge in court, such as attorneys, social workers, and/or law enforcement officials?” Id. 
 97. Id. at 1–2, 4–5. 
 98. Id. at 5. 
 99. Id.  
 100. Id. at 4 (citing In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, 575 F.3d 279 (3d. Cir. 2009)). That 
case, however, seems to express a somewhat extreme view. The material in question was sexually 
explicit, something that would violate the terms of service of the social networking sites. In re 
Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, 575 F.3d 279, 283–84 (3d. Cir. 2009). 
 101. Ethics Comm. of the Ky. Judiciary, Formal Op. JE-119, at 4–5 (2010). 
 102. Cal. Judges Ass’n, Judicial Ethics Comm., Advisory Op. 66, at 6 (2010). 
 103. Id. at 6–7. 
 104. Id.  
 105. Id. at 7, 10. 
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cast doubt on the judge’s ability to be impartial.”
106
 The first factor is the 
nature of the social networking site and the nature of the page.
107
 Thus, if 
a judge used a page for primarily personal reasons, then an attorney 
being “friends” with the judge might create the impression of bias, while 
if a judge used the page to interact with groups like bar associations or 
alumni groups, there would be no appearance of bias.
108
 The second 
factor is the number of “friends” the judge has; a smaller number 
supposedly creates the appearance of more influence.
109
 The third, 
admittedly similar, factor is who the judge includes in her online social 
network, again with more exclusivity meaning a higher chance of the 
appearance of bias or influence.
110
 The fourth factor is how frequently the 
attorney appears before the judge— the only factor requiring analysis of 
facts other than those that can be gleaned from someone’s social 
networking profile.
111
 As one may suspect, according to the Committee, 
the more often the attorney appears before the judge, the greater the 
appearance of bias or influence.
112
 Opinion 66 expanded on this last 
factor by noting that an attorney perhaps should not be included at all in 
a judge’s online social network if the relationship between the two would 
already require disclosure.
113
 
The Committee went on to give an example of an unacceptable 
social networking interaction and an example of an acceptable social 
networking interaction, adding, “The closer a given situation comes to 
one of these examples, the more likely it is that ‘friending’ an attorney is 
either permissible or prohibited.”
114
 In the hypothetical of an 
impermissible interaction, the judge appeared to have a “personal” page 
involving extrajudicial activities, and a former law school classmate 
(“who is not a close friend”) who practiced in the judge’s jurisdiction 
tried to add the judge as a friend.
115
 The permissible hypothetical 
consisted of a judge who was a board member of a local bar association 
and of the local Inns of Court and who merely wanted to update 
participants about the activities of the two organizations or discuss issues 
 
 106. Id. at 8.  
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. This probably means that a site like LinkedIn, because of its professional nature, would 
have a better chance of being acceptable than would a site like Facebook, but the California 
Committee is not clear. 
 109. Id.  
 110. Id. The examples given are a judge being “friends” with a large number of prosecutors but not 
defense attorneys, or a large number of plaintiff’s lawyers and no insurance defense counsel. The 
important factor here is the appearance of bias or influence. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 8–9. 
 114. Id. at 9. 
 115. Id. 
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related to the legal community and profession.
116
 This judge also included 
any lawyer who would like to be a part of his or her online social 
network.
117
 
The California Committee next decided that disclosure is required if 
an attorney is included in the online social network of a judge.
118
 It based 
its decision on “the peculiar nature of online social networking sites” 
because there may be evidence of the connection but not of the extent of 
the connection.
119
 If the site is of a personal nature, but the judge allowed 
the connection because it was unlikely the attorney was going to appear 
before her, then the “judge should disqualify him or herself” if the 
attorney does appear.
120
 
The final issue addressed in Opinion 66 was whether a judge may 
include an attorney in her online social network.
121
 The opinion noted 
that “the judge’s page will include posts the attorneys make on their 
pages.”
122
 This may include acceptable public communications made by 
the attorney that the judge should not see.
123
 The California Committee 
was concerned that if attorney A is included in the judge’s online social 
network, then the judge may see on Attorney A’s profile something 
written by attorney B (an attorney appearing before the judge but not 
included in the judge’s online social network), such as a Facebook 
comment or tweet. Essentially, the committee was worried about 
inadvertent ex parte communications online. 
 2. Other States 
Most of the other states that released opinions believed it was 
acceptable for a judge to include attorneys in her online social network, 
although they did not discuss the matter in as much detail as did 
California Opinion 66. The New York opinion commented that this 
connection was “[i]n some ways . . . no different from adding the person’s 
contact information into the judge’s Rolodex or address book or 
speaking to them in a public setting.”
124
 The Kentucky Ethics 
Committee—the same committee that almost answered “no” as to 
whether judges could participate in online social networks—said it best: 
“While the nomenclature of a social networking site may designate 
certain participants as ‘friends,’ . . . such a listing, by itself, does not 
reasonably convey to others an impression that such persons are in a 
 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 10. 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. (noting that attorneys may discuss their cases more freely than may judges). 
 124. N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op. 08-176 (2009). 
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special position to influence the judge.”
125
 The “intensity” of the 
relationship is what matters, not the term itself.
126
 In fact, “[t]he 
Committee conceives such terms as ‘friend,’ ‘fan’ and ‘follower’ to be 
terms of art.”
127
 This means, according to the Kentucky Ethics 
Committee, judges must be mindful of whether their online connection, 
combined with other factors, rises to the level forbidden by the code.
128
 
The Ohio opinion agreed, referring to the language in the Kentucky 
opinion.
129
 It noted that “not all social relationships, online or otherwise, 
require a judge’s disqualification.”
130
 The South Carolina Advisory 
Committee’s opinion did not address the issue at all.
131
 
The unofficial opinions in Indiana and Wisconsin also did not take 
issue with a judge including attorneys in her online social network. The 
Indiana article stated that judges may “friend” attorneys.
132
 The 
Wisconsin article did not directly address this issue, but in criticizing the 
Florida opinion (and agreeing with the Florida dissenters), it seemed to 
hint that the author, a judge himself, thinks judges should be permitted 
to include attorneys in online social networks.
133
 
Despite later criticisms and characterizations of it,
134
 the Florida 
opinion never stated that judges should be forbidden from including 
attorneys in their online social network.
135
 Instead, the opinion explicitly 
limited judges to including attorneys not in the judge’s area or ones who 
are already listed on the judge’s recusal list.
136
 This means that attorneys 
who cannot appear before the judge or are very unlikely to appear 
 
 125. Ethics Comm. of the Ky. Judiciary, Formal Op. JE-119, at 2 (2010). 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 3 (citing Ky. Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3E(1)). 
 129. Sup. Ct. of Ohio Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline, Op. 2010-7, at 5 (2010). 
 130. Id. at 9. 
 131. The South Carolina opinion answered only the question of whether a magistrate judge may be 
a member of Facebook, doing so in the context of a judge who specifically asked about the possible 
impropriety of being Facebook friends “with several law enforcement officers and employees of the 
Magistrate’s office.” S.C. Advisory Comm. on Standards of Judicial Conduct, Op. 17-2009 (2009). 
 132. Meiring, supra note 4, at 10. 
 133. Sankovitz, supra note 4, at 10. 
 134. See, e.g., John Schwartz, For Judges on Facebook, Friendship Has Limits, N.Y. Times, Dec. 10, 
2009, at A25 (“Judges and lawyers in Florida can no longer be Facebook friends.”); Barb Dybwad, 
Florida to Judges: Don’t Facebook Friend Lawyers, Mashable (Dec. 10, 2009), http://mashable.com/ 
2009/12/10/florida-bans-lawyer-friends/ (analyzing the opinion and noting that the opinion is not a 
complete bar to lawyers and judges being Facebook friends); Violet Petran, Judges and Lawyers Are 
Not Facebook Friends, LegalMatch (Jan. 11, 2010), http://lawblog.legalmatch.com/2010/01/11/judges-
and-lawyers-are-not-facebook-friends/ (“Recently, a Florida Judicial Ethics Advisory Committee 
opines on ethical issues relating to judges’ use of social networking sites like Facebook. The 
verdict . . . judges may not be ‘friends’ (cyber speaking that is) with lawyers.”). 
 135. Fla. Sup. Ct. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2009-20 (2009). 
 136. Id. Interestingly, the opinion speaks of these issues in reference to Facebook but then goes on 
to state that the same conclusions apply to all other social networking sites that allow others, whether 
or not they are a part of the network, to see who the judge has included in her online social network. Id. 
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(because they are based in another state, for example) before the judge 
can be included. The Florida opinion, however, later explained that 
including attorneys who are likely to appear would violate the Florida 
Code of Judicial Conduct.
137
 A minority of the ethics commission 
disagreed, reasoning that the connection between judges and attorneys 
may be described differently online.
138
 
The Oklahoma opinion agreed with Florida’s majority opinion, 
noting connections were permissible but only in limited circumstances.
139
 
Specifically, the Oklahoma Judicial Ethics Advisory Panel declared that 
a judge may have a social networking account, but limited the 
permissible connections to persons who do not regularly appear or who 
are unlikely to appear before the judge.
140
 This limitation includes not 
only attorneys but also social workers, law enforcement officers, and 
“others who regularly appear in court in an adversarial role,” which 
presumably extends to expert witnesses.
141
 It also admonished that “social 
networking sites are fraught with peril for Judges.”
142
 
C. May Judges Be “Friends” with Lawyers Who Are Appearing 
Before Them? 
The states’ judicial ethics opinions differed most on the issue of 
whether a judge may be “friends” with an attorney appearing before her. 
The advisory committees of the states recommended either that a judge 
should not include attorneys appearing before her in her online social 
network, or that the judge should be allowed to, subject to limitations. 
South Carolina did not address this question.
143
 
 1. California 
The California Committee answered this question with a decisive 
“no.”
144
 It said that if an attorney appears before a judge, the judge 
should immediately cease contact on the social networking site to avoid 
any possible appearance of bias.
145
 This is to be done regardless of which 
social networking site the judge and attorney are using.
146
 The Committee 
did not factor the nature of the social networking site into its analysis 
 
 137. Id.  
 138. Id. (“[S]ocial networking sites have become so ubiquitous that the term ‘friend’ on these 
pages does not convey the same meaning that it did in the pre-internet age . . . .”). 
 139. Okla. Judicial Ethics Advisory Panel, Op. 2011-3 (2011). 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. S.C. Advisory Comm. on Standards of Judicial Conduct, Op. 17-2009 (2009). Again, the 
opinion concerned the inclusion of law enforcement officers in the online social network of a judge. 
 144. Cal. Judges Ass’n, Judicial Ethics Comm., Advisory Op. 66, at 11 (2010). 
 145. Id. at 10–11 (“[T]he attorney should be unfriended.”). 
 146. Id. at 11. 
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because it reasoned that continuing contact of any kind creates the 
impression “that the attorney is in a special position to influence the 
judge simply by virtue of the ready access afforded by the social 
networking site.”
147
 
 2. Other States 
All of the other states’ advisory opinions, besides Florida’s, found 
that a judge may be “friends” with an attorney while the attorney is 
appearing before the judge, subject to some limitations. The New York 
opinion warned judges that an online connection, alone or combined 
with other factors, can rise to a level that requires disclosure or recusal.
148
 
Kentucky, as mentioned, also warned judges to be mindful of the 
strength of the connection.
149
 The Ohio opinion had similar sentiments, 
noting that the nature of the relationship (more than just being a 
“friend”) is the important factor, though “not all social relationships, 
online, or otherwise, require a judge’s disqualification.”
150
 
The unofficial opinions from Indiana and Wisconsin were split on 
the question of whether a judge should be allowed to be “friends” online 
with attorneys appearing before the judge. The counsel for the Indiana 
commission had the most nuanced approach, recommending a judge 
eliminate connections with attorneys on MySpace and Facebook but 
seeing no issue with LinkedIn.
151
 Like the California opinion, there was a 
concern about appearance issues, although Indiana only recommended 
(but did not require) that the connection cease.
152
 The Wisconsin judge 
seemed to believe that there would be no issue unless there was a close 
friendship that required recusal, as an online connection is just a 
different way to network.
153
 
Like the California Committee, the Florida Judicial Ethics Advisory 
Committee and the Oklahoma Judicial Ethics Advisory Panel advised 
that a judge not include attorneys who are appearing before her in her 
online social network.
154
 In Opinion 09-20, the Florida committee stated 
that it believed such a connection is improper because it creates an 
 
 147. Id. 
 148. N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op. 08-176 (2009). 
 149. Ethics Comm. of the Ky. Judiciary, Formal Op. JE-119, at 3 (2010). 
 150. Sup. Ct. of Ohio Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline, Op. 2010-7, at 9 (2010). 
 151. Meiring, supra note 4, at 10–11 (discussing how the chance of receiving ex parte 
communications is lower on LinkedIn and how being in the same LinkedIn network is more like being 
in the same bar or alumni association than like being social friends). However, the author of the 
Indiana opinion may change her approach now that users of LinkedIn have “the ability to post daily 
musings.” Id. at 11. 
 152. Id. at 10 (“To avoid issues, the judge may want to remove the attorney . . . as a ‘friend’ from 
his Facebook or MySpace list until the case is over.”). 
 153. Sankovitz, supra note 4, at 11. 
 154. Okla. Judicial Ethics Advisory Panel, Op. 2011-3 (2011); Fla. Sup. Ct. Judicial Ethics 
Advisory Comm., Op. 2009-20 (2009). 
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appearance of bias.
155
 It emphasized that it is the appearance of influence 
that is important—the mere act of identifying a lawyer as a social 
networking friend is the violation of the code—not whether there is any 
chance of influence.
156
 A minority of the Florida committee disagreed, 
noting the mere act does not create the appearance of bias.
157
 
In a second opinion, the Florida committee reaffirmed Opinion 09-
20, again with a minority disagreeing.
158
 The minority opined that because 
social networking sites are growing so quickly, members of the public 
would not immediately think there is an appearance of influence when 
an attorney is a member of a judge’s online social network because they 
know it may mean the two are merely acquainted.
159
 The minority added 
that even if the term “friend” were accepted as referring to actual 
friendship, additional facts are required before recusal because being 
actual friends does not even require disclosure in many instances.
160
 The 
majority, however, reiterated its belief that online connections are 
impermissible because the “unique medium in which internet social 
networking sites permit the networking and sharing of personal 
information and experiences among a select and exclusive community” 
creates the appearance that the attorney is in a position of influence.
161
 
However, the Florida committee unanimously declared that if there is an 
appearance of bias, a judge cannot cure it by adding a disclaimer saying 
he or she will accept as a friend any user with a recognized name or with 
common “friends.”
162
 This was never suggested by any of the other 
opinions, likely because they are less restrictive. 
The Oklahoma opinion was brief but very similar to Florida’s 
Opinion 09-20.
163
 It explicitly agreed with Florida’s opinion that a judge 
would violate ethical rules by including lawyers who appear before her in 
her online social network.
164
 The Oklahoma panel emphasized that the 
appearance of influence was the critical feature that makes such a 
connection improper, and offered the following reasoning: “We believe 
 
 155. Fla. Sup. Ct. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2009-20 (2009). 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Fla. Sup. Ct. Judicial Ethics Advisory Comm., Op. 2010-06 (2010) (“A majority of this 
Committee continues to believe that Fla. JEAC Op. 09-20 was correctly decided and that judges 
should not accept requests from lawyers who appear before them to be recognized as their ‘friends’ or 
contacts on social networking sites.” (emphasis added)). The minority opinion here, however, was 
much more thorough and in-depth than was the previous opinion. Additionally, this opinion included 
a number of case citations, unlike the previous opinion. Id. 
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. (citing cases and prior opinions including one in which a twenty-eight year relationship did 
not necessarily require recusal, and one in which a weekly tennis match did not even require disclosure). 
 161. Id.  
 162. Id.  
 163. Okla. Judicial Ethics Advisory Panel, Op. 2011-3 (2011). 
 164. Id. 
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that public trust in the impartiality and fairness of the judicial system is 
so important that is imperative to err on the side of caution where the 
situation is ‘fraught with peril.’”
165
 Perhaps this is why it suggested the 
strictest guidelines of all of the opinions, extending the prohibition 
beyond attorneys to any person who regularly appears in the judge’s 
court—not even necessarily before the judge.
166
 The Oklahoma panel 
also (oddly) quoted the Kentucky opinion in saying that a judge must 
freely accept restrictions on conduct that may be burdensome to an 
ordinary citizen.
167
 
D. General Concerns of the Advisory Opinions 
These state advisory opinions also contained several other concerns 
relating to the use of social networking sites.
168
 The California opinion 
concluded by saying it had not enacted a per se ban on interactions with 
attorneys who might appear before judges.
169
 It added some general 
advice about checking privacy settings and ended with a statement 
expressing that “notwithstanding the explosion of participation in online 
social networking sites, judges should carefully weigh whether the benefit 
of their participation is worth all the attendant risks.”
170
 
Other opinions noted that “[t]here is something about the ease of 
communication [on social networking sites] that may just make it too 
easy for a judge to slip.”
171
 All of the opinions had similar concerns. New 
York was clear to remind judges that giving legal advice or discussing a 
case would be impermissible.
172
 The Kentucky ethics committee echoed 
these concerns, and it was particularly concerned with ex parte 
communications, noting that a North Carolina judge had been publically 
reprimanded for communicating with an attorney.
173
 It warned judges to 
 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. The opinion, however, explicitly noted that the judge may be connected to court staff. Id. 
 167. Id. (quoting Ethics Comm. of the Ky. Judiciary, Formal Op. JE-119, at 4 (2010)). It is odd 
because the Kentucky opinion—which was quoting the commentary to Canon 2A of the Kentucky 
Code of Judicial Conduct—allowed a judge to use online social networking. Ethics Comm. of the Ky. 
Judiciary, Formal Op. JE-119, at 1, 4 (2010). The context of this quote in the Kentucky opinion, 
however, was noting the limits of the use of online social networking (especially not posting 
inappropriate pictures or commentary), not forbidding the use of the sites.  Id. at 4. 
 168.  These concerns, while not precisely pertinent to this Note, provide essential information for a 
judge who is considering whether she wants to use, or continue to use, any social networking site. 
 169. Cal. Judges Ass’n, Judicial Ethics Comm., Advisory Op. 66, at 11 (2010). 
 170. Id. at 11–12. 
 171. Allison Petty, Social Networking Web Sites Raise Ethical Issues for Judges, Lawyers, 
AllBusiness (Feb. 3, 2010), http://www.allbusiness.com/legal/trial-procedure-judges/13862837.html 
(quoting Cynthia Gray, director of the American Judicature Society Center for Judicial Ethics, who 
was speaking only about Facebook). 
 172. N.Y. Advisory Comm. on Judicial Ethics, Op. 08-176 (2009). 
 173. Ethics Comm. of the Ky. Judiciary, Formal Op. JE-119, at 4–5 (2010) (citing Public 
Reprimand of B. Carlton Terry Jr., N.C. Judicial Standards Comm’n Inquiry No. 08-234 (2009)).  
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be “extremely cautious” on social networking sites.
174
 The Oklahoma 
opinion similarly suggested caution.
175
 The Ohio opinion provided 
guidelines for using social networking sites, including (in addition to 
similar ones mentioned by other states): (1) judges must maintain dignity 
in photographs, (2) judges “must not foster . . . interactions . . . if [they] 
will erode confidence in the independence of judicial decision making,” 
(3) judges must not use social networking sites to do outside research, 
and (4) judges should “be aware of the contents of [their] social 
networking page, be familiar with the social networking site policies and 
privacy controls, and be prudent in all interactions on a social networking 
site.”
176
 The unofficial opinion in Indiana had similar concerns.
177
 The 
Wisconsin article did not address these specific issues. 
III.  California Opinion 66 Is Flawed 
As a matter of law and as a matter of policy, Opinion 66 partially 
missed the mark. Despite using the appropriate canons, the understanding 
of social networking sites displayed by the California Committee led to 
flawed results from a legal perspective. The Committee also failed to 
consider a number of policy issues, especially that California judges are 
elected. To the credit of the Committee, it recognized that Opinion 66 
“promises to be the first of many to address this issue” of ethical 
constraints that arise when a judge participates in online social 
networking in California.
178
 Another opinion is necessary to correct the 
errors in Opinion 66. Hopefully, the California Committee will take 
appropriate action. 
A. Opinion 66 Is Flawed from a Legal Perspective 
The canons of the California Code of Judicial Ethics establish 
standards for actions of judges on and off the bench.
179
 Other relevant 
statutory sources of law in California are sections 170.1 and 170.6 of the 
California Code of Civil Procedure, which contain the grounds for 
voluntary and involuntary disqualification, respectively.
180
 In addition, 
retired judge David Rothman’s California Judicial Conduct Handbook—
a book that “attempt[s] to integrate all available materials on judicial 
ethics in California”—provides guidance for judges.
181
 It is important to 
 
 174. Id. at 5. 
 175. Okla. Judicial Ethics Advisory Panel, Op. 2011-3 (2011). 
 176. Sup. Ct. of Ohio Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances & Discipline, Op. 2010-7, at 7–9 (2010). 
 177. Meiring, supra note 4, at 10–11 (discussing how ex parte information may be inadvertently 
received and how legal advice may be solicited).  
 178. Cal. Judges Ass’n, Judicial Ethics Comm., Advisory Op. 66, at 1 (2010). 
 179. Cal. Code of Judicial Ethics pmbl. (2009). 
 180. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 170.1, 170.6 (2010). 
 181. Rothman, supra note 12, § 1.00. 
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note that in California, advisory opinions about judicial ethics can 
become “authoritative.”
182
 Opinion 66, however, should not. 
The California Committee was concerned about the risk of an 
apparent connection between an attorney and a judge on an online social 
network indicating bias or influence.
183
 The Committee believed this issue 
was largest during trial (or appeal), thus its declaration that a judge 
should not include an attorney in her online social network during that 
period.
184
 This conclusion is based on a partially flawed view of online 
social networking. Opinion 66 correctly noted that, under specific 
circumstances, merely because an attorney is “friends” with a judge does 
not mean the attorney is in a special position to influence the judge.
185
 It 
also set out four important factors as part of the test to determine 
whether there is a possible appearance of impropriety.
186
 Despite this 
test, the Committee concluded that if a judge and an attorney are 
connected on a social networking site, then the judge is always 
disqualified because of an appearance of impropriety unless the judge 
“unfriends” the attorney and discloses the online connection.
187
 Opinion 
66 reached this conclusion without referring to the test it advanced. The 
opinion did say that even if a judge makes a disclosure regarding the 
connection, the judge still must cease online contact so as to avoid the 
appearance of bias or influence.
188
 
The California Committee should have recognized that an online 
connection between an attorney and a judge while a case is pending does 
not warrant recusal under the California Code of Civil Procedure, 
especially if it does not rise to the level of special influence. The test 
under the Code to determine whether a trial judge must be recused is 
whether “[a] person aware of the facts might reasonably entertain a 
doubt that the judge would be able to be impartial.”
189
 Additionally, 
Judge Rothman noted: 
 
 182. See Ethics Committee Advisory Opinions, Cal. Judges Ass’n, http://www.caljudges.org/ 
ethics_opinions.vp.html (last visited Dec. 23, 2011) (declaring that some opinions are authoritative, 
others are no longer applicable, and that others have no comment or distinguishing characteristics). 
Recall that the opinions, while not technically binding, are relied on by the California Commission on 
Judicial Performance and the California Supreme Court. 
 183. Cal. Judges Ass’n, Judicial Ethics Comm., Advisory Op. 66, at 7–10 (2010). 
 184. Id. at 10–11. 
 185. Id. at 7. 
 186. Id. at 8. 
 187. Id. at 10–11. 
 188. Id. at 11. 
 189. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 170.1 (a)(6)(A)(iii) (2010) (emphasis added). If an attorney believes 
there is actual prejudice, she can file a peremptory challenge under section 170.6, which requires an 
affidavit under penalty of perjury stating that the judge is prejudiced. Id. § 170.6(2). Based only on 
online social networking contact, such a motion would likely fail. 
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  The test for disclosure and disqualification in social friendships is 
similar to that which one might employ with respect to a dating 
relationship: is the relationship that of a mere “acquaintance,” in which 
case even disclosure is questionable, or is the person within the inner 
circle of the judge’s intimate friends, such that disqualification is 
required? Between these extremes are the variables, where the 
relationship gradation moves closer to clear disclosure and then to 
clear disqualification. The circumstances might also be such that, 
whereas the judge might not even consider disclosure of an 
acquaintanceship with an attorney appearing in court to represent a 
client, the judge might recuse where the attorney is personally a party 
in the case.
190
 
Online social networks are an indication of social friendships, social 
acquaintances, and professional connections. The relationship between a 
judge and an attorney can be examined by looking at their connection 
and interaction with one another on the particular website. As noted, 
being online “friends” with a judge does not necessarily mean one has 
special access to a judge. Furthermore, attorneys should trust that a 
judge would disclose any improper communication between her and 
opposing counsel during trial (something which may alter the 
situation).
191
 As the actual relationships that a judge has with “friends” in 
her online social network may vary, a social networking connection by 
itself should not raise an improper appearance issue. The opinions in 
Kentucky, New York, and Ohio recognized this fact.
192
 
As mentioned, the California Committee seemed to misinterpret the 
test for recusal provided by the California Code of Civil Procedure, or its 
application, because of a flawed view of social networking sites. The 
Committee’s interpretation is far too strict, as “a person aware of the 
facts” would understand the relationship that online “friends” have with 
one another—namely that a person who understands the facts would not 
think the connection by itself means the judge cannot be impartial. This 
lack of understanding is typified by the first example it gave after it 
described the four-factor test to determine whether “friending” is 
permissible.
193
 In the hypothetical, a former classmate, not a close friend, 
requested to be included in the judge’s online social network.
194
 The 
judge in this situation had a “personal” page and only a small number of 
 
 190. Rothman, supra note 12, § 7.51, at 356–57 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (citing Cal. 
Judges Ass’n, Formal Ethics Op. 45, at 4 (1997)). 
 191. The judge likely would be required to disclose this communication, depending on the 
circumstances, the nature of the communication, and other factors. If, for example, it was a 
“professional” connection, there would be no reason for an attorney to believe there were some kind 
of special access the judge would not disclose. Any communication would be like any other ex parte 
communication. If the communication were related to a professional meeting, such as a bar association 
or alumni meeting, it would not even need to be disclosed. 
 192. See supra notes 124–33, 148–53 and accompanying text. 
 193. See Cal. Judges Ass’n, Judicial Ethics Comm., Advisory Op. 66, at 9 (2010). 
 194. Id. 
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“friends,” including a few colleagues.
195
 The California Committee 
believed this would not be an acceptable interaction.
196
 Unfortunately, 
the Committee did not give enough information for its own test (for 
instance, the judge’s practice for determining who to include was not part 
of the test at all—if the judge had a brand new profile, the lawyer’s 
request might be the first from someone who was not a close friend or 
colleague). Regardless, the California Committee did not seem to 
understand the purpose of social networking sites: to connect or 
reconnect with people you know. In addition, the law regarding recusal 
and disclosure circumstances must be taken into account; a person aware 
of all the facts would still examine the actual relationship and conclude 
that there is no reason a distant classmate would receive preferential 
treatment.
197
 
Ex parte communications also worried the California Committee.
198
 
In general, under Canon 3B(7) of the California Code of Judicial Ethics, 
a judge must disclose all ex parte communications received from an 
attorney in a case over which the judge is presiding.
199
 An improper ex 
parte communication can result in disqualification of the judge: Any such 
communication violates Canon 3B(7) even if it is not prejudicial.
200
 If the 
communication was inadvertent, then the judge must disclose it, but the 
judge does not have to recuse herself unless she cannot be impartial.
201
 
The possibility of ex parte communication may be greater on an online 
social network
202
 because of the public nature of many comments on the 
sites.
203
 This does not mean, however, that a judge should avoid using 
 
 195. Id.  
 196. Id. 
 197. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 170.1 (a)(6)(A)(iii) (2010). Of course, this assumes the judge has no 
history of giving preferential treatment to prior classmates, something that is very easy to assume 
because of the high level of professionalism required of judges. 
 198. Cal. Judges Ass’n, Judicial Ethics Comm., Advisory Op. 66, at 10 (2010). 
 199. Cal. Code. of Judicial Ethics Canon 3B(7) (2009); Rothman, supra note 12, § 5.23, at 220. 
Note that this assumes the ex parte communication is improper: “A judge may initiate or consider any 
ex parte communication when expressly authorized by law to do so.” Cal. Code. of Judicial Ethics 
Canon 3B(7)(e) (2009). For example, under California Penal Code section 987.9, a judge (who is not 
the trial judge) must communicate ex parte with experts, investigators, and others while considering a 
ruling on a motion for ancillary services to assist an indigent defendant in a death penalty case. See 
Cal. Pen. Code § 987.9 (2010); see also 6 B.E. Witkin, California Procedure §§ 58–62 (5th ed. 2008) 
(noting portions of the law regarding permissible ex parte communications in civil cases). 
 200. Rothman, supra note 12, § 5.00, at 195. 
 201. See Judicial Ethics Update, Cal. Judges Ass’n (Apr. 2000), http://www.caljudges.org/ 
ethics_updates_update1999.vp.html. 
 202. These communications can, of course, come from a judge, too. See Petty, supra note 171 
(“There is something, apparently, about technology that encourages people to do things that they 
might not otherwise do . . . .” (quoting Cynthia Gray, director of the American Judicature Society 
Center for Judicial Ethics)).  
 203. By public nature, I mean that unless the judge or attorney explicitly limits what the other can 
see (an action possible only on Facebook so far) then once the two are connected, everything one 
posts can be seen by the other. 
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online social networking because of the possibility of ex parte 
communications: There is a duty to disclose ex parte communications, 
not a duty to avoid situations in which they may occur. The canons 
regarding ex parte communications never mention that a judge must 
avoid such potential situations.
204
 In fact, the opposite is true: Judges 
should interact with the community.
205
 
Opinion 66 also discusses the apparent bias that may result from 
postings on a judge’s profile page by other users.
206
 The Committee stated 
that judges should be responsible for removing certain postings.
207
 
However, it is not legally sound to mandate or suggest that “a judge has 
an obligation to be vigilant” and check frequently to see if anyone posted 
a comment that may be offensive.
208
 First, despite what the California 
Committee believed, comments on the judge’s page do not create an 
impression that the judge has adopted them.
209
 There must be a “public 
manifestation . . . of the judge’s knowing approval of invidious 
discrimination” for “adoption” of a comment to violate the California 
Code of Judicial Ethics.
210
 Without more than the mere appearance of a 
post on a wall, it cannot be said the judge knowingly approved of the 
post. To conclude otherwise would be similar to saying that a person 
adopts all of his or her received emails (which may even include spam), 
assuming the emails were made public.
211
 It may be better if the judge 
disclaims comments, especially particularly offensive comments or posts, 
but this cannot be a requirement. Second, Canon 3A of the California 
Code of Judicial Ethics requires that “judicial duties prescribed by law 
shall take precedence over all other activities.”
212
 Requiring a judge to be 
“vigilant” implies that a judge needs to check frequently to possibly 
 
 204. See Rothman, supra note 12, § 5.00, at 195. 
 205. Id. § 10.00. 
 206. Cal. Judges Ass’n, Judicial Ethics Comm., Advisory Op. 66, at 5 (2010). 
 207. Id. 
 208. Id. (emphasis added).  
 209. This is true for the most part, though there may be times where it is apparent that the judge 
approves (for example, the judge comments on the post, likes the post, reposts or retweets the same 
thing, and so forth). The South Dakota Supreme Court noted this issue in Onnen v. Sioux Falls 
Independent School District No. 49-5, although the Facebook post at issue in that case was a “Happy 
Birthday” post written on the judge’s wall in Czech by a testifying witness. 801 N.W.2d 752, 757 (S.D. 
2011). 
 210. Cal. Code. of Judicial Ethics Canon 2C cmt. (2009). This is, however, still being discussed 
and is not yet “fully answered.” See Rachel M. Zahorsky, Panelists: Judges Should Watch Whom They 
“Friend” on Social Media and What Friends Post About Them, A.B.A. J. (Aug. 6, 2011, 5:04 PM) 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/judges_should_watch_who_they_friend_on_social_media_and
_what_friends_family/ (“One question that was not fully answered by the panel . . . was the extent of 
the judiciary’s responsibility to monitor the activities of friends and family members who might include 
a judge’s likeness or appear to represent a jurist’s opinion or affiliation.”). 
 211. A distinction, of course, can be made between the two because of the public nature of social 
networking sites, even though access can be limited to a degree. 
 212. Cal. Code. of Judicial Ethics Canon 3A (2009) (footnote omitted). 
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remove offending posts. However, judges should not be expected to 
constantly spend time monitoring all of their online social networking 
profiles, which would detract from their duties. This requirement would 
leave them unable to have such profiles at all. 
Opinion 66 treated social networking technology in a special 
manner, in a way that has no basis in the relevant law. There is not a 
single canon or statute relating to judicial ethics, nor a relevant case, that 
mentions online social networking
213
 or that says that a judge using social 
networking sites makes the situation different or creates a different test 
for recusal.
214
 Be that as it may, it is true that new technology does change 
some things when it comes to a judge’s daily activities and judicial 
ethics.
215
 Many of these changes, as will be explained, are for the better. 
B. Opinion 66 Is Flawed from a Policy Perspective 
As a matter of policy, Opinion 66 does not make sense, especially 
with respect to its requirement a judge cease contact on online social 
networks while a case is before her. This requirement may lessen the 
chance of an attorney or party discovering an improper relationship. In 
addition, because California judges are elected, they may be hesitant to 
 
 213. Occasionally, a disciplinary action involves online social networks but does not comment on 
any specific aspects; it merely mentions how social networking led to the improper behavior. See, e.g., 
Public Reprimand of B. Carlton Terry Jr., N.C. Judicial Standards Comm’n Inquiry No. 08-234 (2009) 
(reprimanding a judge for an ex parte communication on Facebook). 
 214. Indeed, the South Dakota Supreme Court expressly noted that a Facebook post by a 
testifying witness wishing a judge “Happy Birthday” is not an ex parte communication because it does 
not concern the proceeding—thus, it is acceptable. Onnen, 801 N.W.2d at 757–58. The court went on 
to hold that even if the post was an ex parte communication, it was uninvited, not related to the case, 
and did not affect the decision because the judge was not even aware it had occurred. Id. at 758. More 
important, the “post did not relate to any facts regarding the case and certainly not to any facts [the 
plaintiff] would need to rebut.” Id. While this case involved a witness and not an attorney, the 
outcome likely would not have been different had an attorney made the post. 
 215. Everyone knows how much easier it is to find information now with a connection to the 
Internet. Judges must resist the temptation to research on the Internet, as they have a duty to consider 
only what is before them before. See Judicial Ethics Update, Cal. Judges Ass’n (Mar. 2005), 
http://www.caljudges.org/ethics_october_2004_ethics_update.vp.html (“A judge should not use the 
internet to research the validity of facts presented in court proceedings.”). But see A.B. v. State, 885 
N.E.2d 1223, 1224 (Ind. 2008) (“The Commentary to Canon 3B of the Indiana Code of Judicial 
Conduct advises: ‘A judge must not independently investigate facts in a case and must consider only 
the evidence presented.’ Notwithstanding this directive, in order to facilitate understanding of the facts 
and application of relevant legal principles, this opinion includes information regarding the operation 
and use of MySpace from identified sources outside the trial record of this case.” (emphasis added)). 
Also, Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts—who is not bound by any code of conduct—did 
online research before deciding Arizona Free Enterprise Fund v. Bennett, 131 S. Ct. 2806 (2011), and 
McCormish v. Bennett, 130 S. Ct. 1498 (2010) (mem.). See Ira Pilchen, Social Media Has Benefits and 
Pitfalls for Courts, Panelists Say, ABANOW (Aug. 7, 2011), http://www.abanow.org/2011/08/ 
social-media-has-benefits-and-pitfalls-for-courts-panelists-say/ (discussing Chief Justice Roberts’ 
comments during oral arguments and noting a that district court judge questioned Chief Justice Roberts’ 
actions).  
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remove attorneys from an online social network and risk losing their 
political support. 
The most concerning policy implication of Opinion 66 is that judges 
cannot engage in what is becoming normal behavior: using online social 
networks.
216
 It is true, as the California Code of Judicial Ethics provides, 
that to avoid irresponsible or improper conduct, “[a] judge 
must . . . accept restrictions on the judge’s conduct that might be viewed 
as burdensome by other members of the community and should do so 
freely and willingly.”
217
 Yet a judge can likely use social networking sites 
while still avoiding both irresponsible and improper conduct. This is true 
even when an attorney in the judge’s online social network appears in 
her court.
218
 If judges are restricted from using the sites, there may be an 
unfortunate situation similar to what occurred in Florida: judges 
removing a number of their “friends” or even shutting down their social 
networking accounts completely.
219
 
Opinion 66 also recommended that judges disclose online social 
networking contact with attorneys, especially if one of the attorneys 
appears in the judge’s court.
220
 Although the idea makes sense, the 
Committee’s belief that the nature of the online connection requires 
automatic disclosure is misguided.
221
 It seems this conclusion is due to 
some idea of special access or contact with the judge. Yet often judges’ 
official email addresses, phone numbers, and mailing addresses are 
extremely easy to discover,
222
 so contacting a judge is not difficult. An 
attorney may already have the judge’s email address. The analysis must 
turn on the nature of the relationship, not on the possibility of contact. 
 
 216. LaRoe, supra note 9 (“[Judge Grewal of the Northern District of California] is among a class 
of younger judges adamant about keeping their social networks going despite the tightrope they must 
walk.”). 
 217. Cal. Code. of Judicial Ethics Canon 2A cmt. (2009). But “[t]he Commentary does not 
constitute additional rules and should not be so construed.” Id. at pmbl. 
 218. This seems like a bold assertion, but it has to be true. As mentioned, around 40% of judges 
are using social networking sites and the number of cases in which a judge has been disciplined is 
extremely small. The only public reprimand so far is of Judge B. Carlton Terry, Jr., in North Carolina. 
See Public Reprimand of B. Carlton Terry Jr., N.C. Judicial Standards Comm’n Inquiry No. 08-234 
(2009). In addition, there was a judge in Georgia who resigned after questions arose about his contact 
with a defendant, including “Facebook e-mails” that detailed the relationship between the two. Debra 
Cassens Weiss, Ga. Judge Resigns After Questions Raised About Facebook Contacts, A.B.A. J. (Jan. 7, 
2010, 10:44 AM) http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/ga._judge_resigns_after_questions_raised_ 
about_facebook_contacts/. 
 219. Sarah Lundy, Judges Find Facebook Can Be a Lonely Place, Orlando Sentinel (Jan. 1, 2010), 
http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/2010-01-01/news/0912310148_1_facebook-friends-judges-question-
social networking-site (discussing the reactions of judges in Florida to its advisory opinion). 
 220. Cal. Judges Ass’n, Judicial Ethics Comm., Advisory Op. 66, at 10–11 (2010). 
 221. Id. at 11. 
 222. Judges’ email addresses are frequently some combination of the judge’s first name, or first 
initial, and their last name plus the court’s domain name. For example: “JMarshall@SupremeCourt.org” 
or “JohnMarshall@SupremeCourt.org.” These domain names are not hard to discover because usually 
there will be at least one email address listed on the court’s website that uses the domain name. 
Hull_63-HLJ-595 (Do Not Delete) 12/26/2011 4:02 PM 
624 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 63:595 
The law does not require a judge to disclose all social contact,
223
 and from 
a policy perspective, disclosure should be up to the judge. Furthermore, 
courts are busy and congested. As such, it makes more sense to trust 
judges to act properly and disclose connections that may be an issue.
224
 
Without such trust, an unworkable system would result, one with 
frequent recusals, causing cases to shift from one judge to another. Most 
judges know that if the situation calls for disclosure or recusal, they have 
the discretion to analyze the situation and act as they deem 
appropriate.
225
 This does not mean that a judge will never have to 
disclose an online contact—sometimes the judge may feel it is 
appropriate to do so. An automatic disclosure of all contacts, however, is 
far too burdensome. 
It may be an even better policy to encourage a judge to include an 
attorney in her online social network, as this might help attorneys and 
judges adhere to their respective codes of conduct. A judge has a duty to 
“take appropriate corrective action” if the judge has “personal 
knowledge” that an attorney has violated any provisions of the Rules of 
Professional Conduct.
226
 In Texas, which has a similar rule, a judge did 
just that: Judge Susan Criss denied a continuance to an attorney who had 
posted several updates about drinking and partying during the week, but 
when appearing before Judge Criss, asked for a continuance because of 
the death of her father.
227
 An attorney may, of course, be wary of 
connecting with a judge.
228
 It is not, and should not, be a requirement that 
an attorney include a judge in the attorney’s online social network. In 
addition, a judge should not have to police the attorneys who appear 
before them, but if an attorney and judge become “friends,” then such 
 
 223. See supra Part III.A. 
 224. But see Debra Lyn Bassett, Recusal and the Supreme Court, 56 Hastings L.J. 657, 670 (2005) 
(“[T]he judge’s belief that she is not biased is not conclusive, and indeed, is irrelevant.”). 
 225. Judges even have a checklist to help them. See Rothman, supra note 12, at app. F (giving trial 
judges a six-step checklist for determining whether recusal or disclosure is appropriate and what to do 
if either is appropriate).  
 226. Cal. Code of Judicial Ethics Canon 3D(2) (2009). California law also “imposes additional 
reporting requirements regarding lawyers.” See id. at Canon 3D cmt. 
 227. Molly McDonough, Facebooking Judge Catches Lawyer in Lie, Sees Ethical Breaches, 
A.B.A. J. (July 31, 2009, 2:16 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/facebooking_judge_ 
catches_lawyers_in_lies_crossing_ethical_lines_abachicago/. 
 228. Alex Ginsberg, SI Judge Is Red “Face”d, N.Y. Post (Oct. 15, 2009, 10:44 AM), 
http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/staten_island/item_1TCZaxBoS2p5oOyES11jPN (“[Receiving a 
friend request from a judge] puts the lawyer in a very uncomfortable position. If you say no, and then 
you have to appear before him and ask for bail. And if you say yes, that’s also awkward.”); Petty, 
supra note 171 (“I don’t know if I necessarily would want the judges to be aware of what’s going on in 
my personal life . . . .” (quoting Christopher J. McGeehan, a partner in a technology law firm)); cf. 
Paul B. Kennedy, Can’t We All Just Be Friends?, Def. Rests (Feb. 10, 2011), http://kennedy-
law.blogspot.com/2011/02/cant-we-all-just-be-friends.html (“Judge Susan Criss in Galveston [Texas] 
and I are ‘friends’ on Facebook. I practice in her court. I have no special privileges when I set foot in 
her courtroom. Judge Criss posts pictures of the sun setting over the island and of her dogs chewing up 
her slippers. It’s funny.”). 
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policing is possible. An online connection may cause an attorney at least 
to pause before posting a potentially violative statement on a social 
networking site. Social networking may improve judicial ethics, as well, 
because a judge has a similar duty to initiate corrective action if she has 
“reliable information” that another judge has violated the California 
Code of Judicial Ethics.
229
 
Another important policy consideration relates to judicial elections 
in particular: An elected judge should be able to include attorneys in her 
online social network.
230
 This should be allowed regardless of the chance 
of an attorney appearing before the judge. In California, judges are 
elected (in an initial election or approval of appointment, a reelection, or 
a “confirmation” election).
231
 A California judge may receive a donation 
for an election from an attorney and still hear a case involving that 
attorney,
232
 which arguably would make a judge appear more biased than 
would having an online connection with the attorney. Judges in some 
states use or create their social networking profile during elections
233
 
because it is an effective way to connect with attorneys.
234
 While it is true 
that on Facebook a judge may be able to make a public profile or “fan” 
page,
235
 this is not true for other social networking sites, nor is it practical 
for some judges to do. For example, a judge may already have a number 
of Facebook friends who are attorneys and creating a fan page does not 
ensure the attorneys will all become “fans” of the judge. 
As for attorneys appearing before the judge, if the judge had to 
remove each one from her list of online “friends” before trial, not only is 
there no guarantee that the attorney would rejoin the judge’s online 
social network, there is even the danger of the appearance of bias. This 
may occur when the judge or attorney “friends” the other after the trial. 
The appearance of bias may also go the other way (that is, the judge may 
 
 229. Cal. Code of Judicial Ethics Canon 3D(1) (2009). 
 230. Because Opinion 66 did not address the question, this Note is not directly discussing any 
ethical issues relating to social networking sites and judicial elections. 
 231. 2 B.E. Witkin Legal Inst., supra note 199, §§ 2–3. 
 232. Cal. Code of Judicial Ethics Canon 5A cmt. (2009) (“In judicial elections, judges are 
neither required to shield themselves from campaign contributions nor are they prohibited from 
soliciting contributions from anyone including attorneys. Nevertheless, there are necessary limits on 
judges facing election if the appearance of impropriety is to be avoided. Although it is improper for a 
judge to receive a gift from an attorney subject to exceptions noted in Canon 4D(6), a judge’s 
campaign may receive attorney contributions.”) 
 233. See Petty, supra note 171 (discussing the use of Facebook by Judge William H. Hooks for his 
election campaign); Editorial: Facebook Requires Judges’ Caution, News Herald (Dec. 13, 2010), 
http://www.news-herald.com/articles/2010/12/13/opinion/nh3400373.txt?viewmode=fullstory 
(discussing Judge Eugene A. Lucci’s use of Facebook during his election and mentioning that several 
judges created new profiles during the election cycle). 
 234. See, e.g., Christie L. Smith, Newsflash . . . Social Media, Texas Ctr. for the Judiciary, 
http://www.yourhonor.com/SocialMediaPartOne.html (last visited Dec. 23, 2011) (noting the use of 
Facebook and LinkedIn by a judge elected to the bench). 
 235. See supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text. 
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appear to be biased against the attorney because she “unfriended” the 
attorney). Opinion 66 recommended disclosure when a judge has 
included an attorney in her online social network because of a belief that 
the attorney was not going to appear before the judge, but somehow did.
236
 
Another extremely important policy issue relating to Opinion 66 is 
transparency. Even if a judge decides not to use social networking sites, 
contact with the judge’s close friends will still take place. By allowing, or 
encouraging, judges to use social networking sites, these relationships 
become more transparent. Although this Note advocates that judges 
should be trusted, there are times where the judge may simply forget to 
disclose that she went to high school, college, or law school with an 
attorney appearing before her or may believe wholeheartedly that 
disclosure is unnecessary because she will not act in a biased fashion. 
When the contact occurs online, especially if opposing counsel “friends” 
the judge, then the entire process will be more transparent. The 
Facebook “friendship page” would particularly help with transparency 
because it is an amalgamation of the contact between a judge and an 
attorney. 
Furthermore, online social networking allows the judge to reach a 
broader audience so the judge can help educate the public about the 
law.
237
 Judges, subject to some restraints, should not be separated from 
the community in which they live: “Complete separation of a judge from 
extrajudicial activities is neither possible nor wise; a judge should not 
become isolated from the community in which the judge lives.”
238
 Online 
social networking, with its widespread use, is almost certain to be a part 
of a judge’s community. Isolation from that avenue of communication is 
not wise and may hinder the judge’s duty to, among other things, act as a 
leader in the community, promote understanding of and confidence in 
the administration of justice, and help the public understand the courts.
239
 
C. The California Judicial Ethics Committee Did Not Get 
Everything Wrong 
Despite its flaws, Opinion 66 had a number of valid points. It is 
relatively uncontroversial for judges to use social networking sites, 
something the opinion noted.
240
 In addition, the opinion listed a number 
 
 236. Cal. Judges Ass’n, Judicial Ethics Comm., Advisory Op. 66, at 10 (2010). 
 237. Rothman, supra note 12, § 10.00, at 522 (“[A] judge has a duty to help educate the public.”). 
 238. Cal. Code of Judicial Ethics Canon 4A cmt. (2009). 
 239. Cal. R. Court 10.5 (2007) (describing the role of the judiciary in the community); see also 
Cal. Code of Judicial Ethics Canon 4B cmt. (“As a judicial officer and person specially learned in 
the law, a judge is in a unique position to contribute to the improvement of the law, the legal system, 
and the administration of justice . . . .”). 
 240. Cal. Judges Ass’n, Judicial Ethics Comm., Advisory Op. 66, at 3–4 (2010). Indeed, all of the 
advisory opinions that have been released allow a judge to use social networking sites, albeit with 
different limitations. See supra Part II.B. 
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of important ethical considerations for judges to consider while using 
online social networking.
241
 The opinion also reminded judges to be 
aware of privacy settings on social networking sites—both for ethics-
related and non ethics-related reasons.
242
 It closed with a reminder 
unrelated to ethics but important for all judges, maybe even all people, 
using social networking sites: Be mindful of security because “[i]t is 
frightening how much someone can learn about another person from a 
few Internet searches.”
243
 
IV.  What the California Judicial Ethics Committee  
Should Propose 
Since Opinion 66 is not yet authoritative according to the California 
Committee, it can release a new opinion correcting itself. The California 
Committee should propose a more nuanced approach to dealing with 
issues that arise out of online social networking. It must recognize that 
many people who will become judges are already using social networking 
sites and it must consider in more depth what judges can do online. 
Imagine the following situation: An assistant district attorney, one 
who has been working for fifteen years in criminal law, is appointed to be 
a judge. While in law school, the attorney added or accepted some fellow 
law students as Facebook friends. Since becoming a district attorney, 
however, most of her Facebook friends who are lawyers are ones with 
whom she works. Furthermore, she frequently spends time with these 
fellow district attorneys, so her Facebook wall contains a few posts from 
them. Maybe this attorney, at one time or another, rejected the requests 
of criminal defense counsel to be “friends”—for perfectly innocent 
reasons such as “I do not really know you,” “I do not see you 
frequently,” or “I forgot to accept the friend request.” According to 
Opinion 66, this hypothetical situation would require the new judge to 
disqualify herself on any criminal cases involving the attorneys with 
whom she is online friends. She would even have to recuse herself if the 
prosecutor in a case she hears is a new assistant district attorney hired 
 
 241. Cal. Judges Ass’n, Judicial Ethics Comm., Advisory Op. 66, at 4–6. 
 242. Id. at 11. 
 243. Id.; see also John M. Annese, Staten Island Criminal Court Judge to Be Transferred to 
Manhattan After Facebook Postings, Sources Say, Staten Island Advance, Oct. 15, 2009, 
http://www.silive.com/news/index.ssf/2009/10/criminal_court_judge_to_be_tra.html (detailing how 
Judge Matthew Sciarrino was transferred because of his Facebook page, which allowed the public to 
view aspects of his private life and “blow-by-blow details of his location and schedule”). In addition, a 
judge may not be anonymous when she puts something online. See Leila Atassi, Cuyahoga County 
Judge Shirley Strickland Saffold Files $50 Million Lawsuit Against The Plain Dealer and Others, 
Cleveland.com (Apr. 8, 2010, 12:00 AM), http://blog.cleveland.com/metro/2010/04/ 
cuyahoga_county_judge_shirley.html (discussing the suit of Judge Shirley Strickland against The Plain 
Dealer, an Ohio newspaper, for publishing registration information and revealing that a certain 
username made comments—which included comments about cases before the judge—and that the 
particular username was registered to an email address linked to the judge). 
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just out of law school, one whom the she had seen only once at the DA’s 
office but whose “friend” request she had accepted before leaving. 
This is a flawed approach, especially if the hypothetical is changed 
to address an area of law in which specialized knowledge is particularly 
useful. In fact, for this particular hypothetical, the California Code of 
Civil Procedure would not require recusal.
244
 In a specialized area of law, 
the relevant limitation is a two-year wait before hearing cases involving 
attorneys in the judge’s former firm or private practice.
245
 For a situation 
like this, especially one involving a firm, the California Commission on 
Judicial Performance advises disclosure and caution.
246
 
This is not to say that a criminal defense attorney would have no 
concerns in the hypothetical situation described above, but the point is 
that the new judge’s online social network is not what created the issue. 
Instead, the actual facts surrounding the relationship may give rise to a 
need for disclosure or recusal. The social network at issue should make 
some difference as well—a connection on LinkedIn is probably less 
concerning than an intimate connection on Facebook or the judge 
following the attorney on Twitter. And in the future it may be that online 
relationships are assumed, especially as increasing numbers of people use 
online social networks. Again, the test for self-recusal is whether a judge 
“believes there is a substantial doubt as to his or her capacity to be 
impartial” or whether “[a] person aware of the facts might reasonably 
entertain a doubt that the judge would be able to be impartial.”
247
  
In addition, the California opinion should have expanded on what it 
believes is proper or improper for a judge. It seems axiomatic that a 
judge should not act like a college student,
248
 but one would hope the 
judge would refrain from doing so regardless. Alcohol is certainly a 
sensitive issue for judges,
249
 which perhaps is why the example about a 
judge refraining from posting pictures of or herself “engaging in drunken 
 
 244. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 170.1(a) (2010) (“A judge shall be disqualified if . . . . he or she 
personally advised or in any way represented the public agency concerning the factual or legal issues in 
the proceeding.”). 
 245. Id. § 170.1(a)(2)(B). 
 246. For example, the Commission issued an advisory letter in the case of a judge who presided 
over a case in which one of the attorneys was his former law partner. The Commission concluded that 
because “the judge had left the partnership somewhat more than two years earlier, the judge was not 
automatically disqualified,” but that “the relationship should have been disclosed on the record.” 
State of Cal. Comm’n on Judicial Performance, 1993 Annual Report 19 (1993). 
 247. Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 170.1(a)(6)(A)(ii)–(iii). 
 248. Cal. Judges Ass’n, Judicial Ethics Comm., Advisory Op. 66, at 5 (2010). 
 249. Indeed, the California Code of Judicial Ethics makes special mention of the reporting 
requirement for misdemeanors involving alcohol, controlled substances, and prescriptions. See Cal. 
Code of Judicial Ethics Canon 3D(3) (2009); see also In re Judge Donald R. Alvarez, Cal. Comm’n 
on Judicial Performance, at 3 (2005) (“To protect the public, when a judge is charged with an alcohol-
related charge, it is the commission’s policy to investigate not only the charged incident but also 
whether there is a substance abuse problem that is affecting the judge’s performance of judicial 
duties.”). 
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revelry” appeared obvious to the writers of Opinion 66.
250
 The example 
is, however, a bit extreme.
251
 A judge, however, should follow the general 
rule of avoiding demeaning the judicial office. The test Rothman gives is 
an excellent one: “Write yourself the worst headline about this thought or 
action that you can think of for the next day’s newspaper . . . . If this gives 
you pause, then you probably have an issue relating to ethics.”
252
 Judges 
should especially consider this test when attempting to use humor.
253
 
A nuanced approach to judicial ethics would be better as well. The 
California Committee attempted to do this by setting forth a number of 
factors to consider.
254
 This proposal was an intriguing start, though the 
fourth factor, how regularly the attorney appears before the judge, 
should be removed from the test for the appearance of impropriety 
because continual appearances before a judge do not necessarily lead to 
any appearance of bias unless the judge explicitly mentions a dislike of 
the attorney (or vice versa). The nature of the social networking site and 
profile are relevant (that is, whether they are professional or personal), 
as is the judge’s practice of determining who to include. To a degree, this 
also means that the number of Facebook friends a judge has is relevant, 
though this is probably enveloped by the other factors. For example, if a 
judge’s profile is recently created but includes anyone who wants to be 
“friends” with the judge, it would probably be acceptable, as would be 
the professional profile of a judge who has a policy of accepting as 
“friends” only attorneys within her jurisdiction. The most important 
factor seems to be who the judge includes in her network. 
Judges should consider following the approach of Judge Criss. She 
has a personal Facebook profile that appears to be of a personal 
nature,
255
 but avoids politics and talking about any cases.
256
 She also 
accepts all lawyers who “friend” her and follows all of the relevant 
 
 250. Cal. Judges Ass’n, Judicial Ethics Comm., Advisory Op. 66, at 5 (2010). 
 251. In addition, the California Committee does not define “drunken revelry” anywhere. A picture 
of a judge drinking may be ambiguous—it can be impossible to tell if the judge is “engaged in revelry” 
or not. 
 252. Rothman, supra note 12, § 1.66, at 32; see also LaRoe, supra note 9 (discussing the policy of 
Magistrate Judge Nandor Vadas). 
 253. Marshall Rudolph, Judicial Humor: A Laughing Matter?, 41 Hastings L.J. 175, 187 (1989) 
(noting the danger of judges attempting humor on the bench). Judicial attempts at humor off the 
bench also are not always received well. In general, judges should use this test before they act. See, 
e.g., In re Ellender, 889 So. 2d 225, 227–28 (La. 2004) (disciplining a white judge for wearing a 
blackface mask at a Halloween party as part of his prisoner costume, while his wife was dressed as a 
police officer). But see In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, 632 F.3d 1289 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The 
mere fact that a statement takes the form of a joke does not render it misconduct; humor is the pepper 
spray in the arsenal of persuasive literary ordnance: It is often surprising, disarming and, when 
delivered with precision, highly effective.”).  
 254. Cal. Judges Ass’n, Judicial Ethics Comm., Advisory Op. 66, at 8 (2010). 
 255. Kennedy, supra note 228 (noting that Judge Criss posts pictures of things like her dog chewing 
her slippers). 
 256. McDonough, supra note 227 (detailing Judge Criss’s policy). 
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ethical canons of her state.
257
 While she has not expanded to other sites, a 
judge using other sites could follow similar guidelines. Indeed, it appears 
that recent appointees do an excellent job of policing themselves, similar 
to Judge Criss, especially avoiding political posts.
258
 
The guidelines given by Kentucky, New York, and Ohio are similar 
to Judge Criss’s approach. All three opinions expressed concerns 
regarding the nature of online social networking (for example, 
heightened issues of an appearance of impropriety, potentially greater 
danger of comments on cases, and the need to maintain a high standard 
of conduct) but did not decide that there was any difference between 
online social networking and other contact with attorneys. This is a good 
approach: The judge should be aware of issues but still know the 
respective judicial code applies. There should not be any special rules for 
online connections. 
While a judge could use an approach like Judge Criss’s social 
networking sites like Facebook, there is a need for a nuanced analysis of 
the individual social networking sites because of the different nature of 
each. For example, on Twitter, connections are not mutual, making who 
the judge chooses to follow a more involved ethical choice.
259
 If the judge 
has a policy, however, of following any attorney who chooses to follow 
her, or perhaps a policy of following only organizations that are not 
political in nature, it is likely acceptable. A judge should be able to 
follow biased organizations relating to “improvement of the law, the 
legal system, or the administration of justice” 
260
 if the judge also follows 
the other side. For example, if a judge follows a local district attorney’s 
office and a local public defender’s office (assuming both are using 
Twitter), this would be acceptable. This is an area the California 
Committee should analyze in more detail to test the limits of what else 
may be acceptable. 
The analysis for LinkedIn is short: consider the judge’s practice of 
including certain people. There are also possible ethical issues with what 
a judge posts, but this issue is not unique to this site. Here, the ethical 
issue is more about the effect of having a judge included in an attorney’s 
network. The interesting question—unexplored by this Note—is whether 
this would be enough to qualify as endorsing the attorney or 
recommending the attorney, as judges have special rules for 
recommendations because of the prestige of the judicial office.
261
 
 
 257. Id. 
 258. See LaRoe, supra note 9 (discussing the way recent appointees change the substance of their 
posts after joining the bench). 
 259. This raises possible issues of endorsement and may, therefore, violate Canon 2B of the 
California Code of Judicial Ethics. 
 260. This language is used frequently throughout the California Code of Judicial Ethics. See, e.g., 
Cal. Code of Judicial Ethics Canon 4C(2) (2009). 
 261. See id. Canon 2B. 
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The analysis for MySpace likely would be similar to the analysis for 
Facebook. The sites are fairly similar, though perhaps the different user 
base raises other issues.
262
  
The analysis for Google+ would depend on what action the judge is 
taking. Posts would be subject to the same scrutiny mentioned in 
discussing the other social networks. What is different, however, is the way 
people connect on Google+. As mentioned, Google+ allows a user to 
separate contacts into “circles” which means that a judge would be able to 
separate attorneys into separate circles or post things that only a certain 
group of people could see, as is possible on Twitter. 
263
 This could lessen 
the chance of an ex parte communication (for example, the judge could 
avoid looking at a certain circle or have a special circle for attorneys 
appearing before them).
264
 
Conclusion 
Given the ubiquity of these sites today, it is safe to say that there are 
many judges in California using online social networking of some kind and 
that this number will continue to grow. The use of social networking sites 
by judges to make connections should not be restricted. The California 
Committee suggested that it is acceptable for judges to use social 
networking and to be online friends with attorneys generally, but not to be 
“friends” with an attorney appearing before the judge. This conclusion is 
flawed from both a legal and policy perspective. Instead, as many other 
states agree, judges should be able to use these sites at all times—as long as 
the judges adhere to their respective code of conduct—even when an 
attorney included in their online social network appears before them. 
The California Committee should release a new opinion to correct 
and supplement Opinion 66. This new opinion should include a more 
nuanced approach to online social networking that considers the 
differences in the various types of social networking sites. It should also 
include a new test for possible recusal in the specific area of social 
networking and a new set of guidelines for judges using online social 
networking. A new test for recusal should consider each social networking 
site individually, the different possible actions on each site, and would have 
to include some kind of analysis of the actual relationship between the 
judge and the attorney. 
 
 262. See Harris, supra note 49 (“MySpace is still rather popular among individuals who end up in 
the criminal justice system.”).  Furthermore, there is at least one judge who searches social networking 
profiles of adjudicated offenders, something that would logically lead to searches of MySpace—
although the legality of this practice has not been analyzed. Richard Acello, Web 2.Uh-oh, A.B.A. J. 
(Dec. 1, 2009, 9:29 PM), http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/web_2.uh-oh/. 
 263. See Hartman, supra note 54 (describing the “double filter” model and noting it is very similar 
to Twitter). 
 264. Of course, this site is still developing, so it will be interesting to see what other features develop. 
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